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MIS MÕJUTAB NAISTE VALIMISEDU? EESTI 2015. JA 2019. AASTA 
PARLAMENDIVALIMISTE ANALÜÜS 
Helen Urmann 
Resümee 
Kuigi naised moodustavad riikide populatsioonist vähemalt poole, ei kajastu see enamasti 
proportsionaalselt naiste kirjeldava esindatuse määras parlamentides. Naiste osakaal 
Riigikogus on iseseisvumisperioodi jooksul kasvanud, kuid jäänud ka naiste jaoks kõige 
edukamaks osutunud 2019. aasta parlamendivalimistel siiski alla 30%. Selline tendents 
pole omane vaid Eestile, vaid on täheldatav ka ülemaailmselt – keskmine naisesindajate 
osakaal jääb 24% piirimaile (Interparliamentary Union 2019). Kuivõrd poliitika on üks 
tähtsaid esindusvaldkondi kogu ühiskonnas, võib eeldada, et poliitiliste ressursside, k.a. 
võimu ebaühtlane jaotumine toob kaasa negatiivsed mõjud, muuhulgas puuduliku 
poliitikafookuse, lõhestumise, aga ka ühiskondlike normide manifesteerumise, mis 
võivad luua väärarusaamad teatud ühiskondlike gruppide võimekusest. Poliitilise 
ebavõrdsuse tekketegurite selgitamine on seega asjakohane, mõistmaks ebavõrdsust ka 
laiemas ühiskondlikus plaanis.  
Naiste valimisedu mõjutavad nii riik, parteid kui ka valijad ning seda erinevatel tasanditel 
kandideerimis- ja valimisotsuseid tehes. Antud töö taustal on eeldatud, et kõikide 
poliitiliste toimijate käitumine on otseselt või kaudselt ajendatud institutsioonilistest 
piirangutest – kuigi Eestis pole rakendatud riiklikke kvoodimeetmeid naiste osakaalu 
mõjutamiseks, võib eeldada, et teised institutsioonilised faktorid, sealhulgas näiteks 
valimisnimekirjade süsteem või ringkonna suurus, võivad toimijate motiivide kaudu 
naiste edupotentsiaalile mõju avaldada. Selliselt võib uurida, millised asjaolud on 
määravad kandidaatide valimisedu saavutamisel – ja ennekõike, kas naiseks olemisel on 
valituks osutumisel mõju.  
Antud lõputööl on kaks eesmärki. Esiteks rakendatakse Mirjam Alliku (2015) esitatud 
analüüsilist raamistikku uutele valimistele, replikeerides analüüsi ka 2015. ja 2019. aasta 
valimiste andmetele. See lisab olemasolevale analüüsile informatsiooni viimaste 
valimiste tulemuste kohta, täiendades seega ülevaadet kandidaatide edufaktoritest Eestis. 
Varasemate valimiste analüüside informatsiooniga täiendamine võimaldab muuhulgas 
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arutleda selle üle, mis võiks olla aluseks naiste poliitilise osakaalu aeglasele kuid üldisele 
tõusule Riigikogus viimase kolmekümne aasta vältel. Teiseks, avalike andmete 
olemasolu Eesti valimiste kontekstis võimaldab valimisedu faktoreid analüüsida 
kandidaadi tasandil – sellised analüüsid pole kuigi levinud, kuivõrd andmete puudujäägid 
on täheldatud üheks suuremaks probleemiks sarnaste uuringute läbiviimisel mujal 
riikides. See võimaldab testida veel täiendavate muutujate mõju valimisedule, üritamaks 
hinnata erinevate mõjurite rolli Riigikogu “populatsiooni” kujundamisel.  
Töö tulemusel selgus, et naiseks olemist ei saa tingimata seostada madalama 
valimiseduga. Kuigi naiseks olemisel oli statistiliselt oluline negatiivne seos 
häältesaagiga 2019. aasta valimiste puhul, on erisused naiste ja meeste vahel 
“grupisiseselt” siiski väiksed – kogenud aga ka esmakordselt kandideerinud 
naiskandidaadid ei kaotanud valimisedus naiseks olemise tõttu. Oluline erinevus kerkis 
üksnes haridustaseme puhul, mis viitas, et vähesema haridusega naised koguvad vähem 
hääli, kuid sugude vahelised erinevused ühtlustusid kõrgharitud kandidaatide puhul. 
Naiseks olemisel polnud valituks osutumise “määramisel” mõju. 
Tähelepanuväärseimateks mõjufaktoriteks edule on ennekõike siiski poliitilise kogemuse 
omamine, aga ka erakonna populaarsus ning kandidaatide kõrgemad kohad 
ringkonnanimekirjas. Selliselt võib eeldada, et erinevused naiste ja meeste valimisedus 
on väiksed ning erisused – kui need on täheldatavad – on tingitud just ennekõike 
erinevustest gruppide vahel. Kuivõrd naisriigikogulasi on parlamendis olnud vähem, ei 
pruugi positiivse seose puudumine naiseks olemise ja valituks osutumise vahel 
tähendada, et naised on vähem-eelistatud. Pigem eelistavad nii valijad kui erakonnad 
kogenud kandidaate, kelle seas on naisi vähem. See puudutab ka kandidaatide paigutust 
parteinimekirjas – kuigi naiskandidaatide puhul võis täheldada nende kõrgemat kohta 
üldnimekirjas, seda nii parteisid kombineeriva mudeli tulemuste põhjal kui ka hinnates 
mõju erakondade lõikes eraldi (v.a. Konservatiivse Rahvaerakonna puhul, milles 
naiskandidaate paigutati madalamatele kohtadele), siis läbivalt oluliseks ja 
tähelepanuväärseks mõjufaktoriks saab pidada siiski viimatist poliitilist kogemust. 
Suletud nimekirjade kontekstis võib see viidata, et erakonnad soovivad minimeerida 
avatud nimekirjadega kaasnevaid riske nende eelistatud kandidaatide valituks 
osutumisele ning kindlustavad selliselt ennekõike “tugevate” kandidaatide huvid.  
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Seega – “naiseks olemise” efekt üksi ei selgita valimisedu ning seeläbi sugudevahelist 
ebaproportsionaalsust Riigikogus. Küll aga võimaldab naiseks olemise efekti hindamine 
kandidaatide “alagruppide” lõikes mõista, mis on võimalike erisuste aluseks. Viimaste 
valimiste analüüs kinnitas, et sarnaste nais- ja meeskandidaatide vahel pole valimisedu 
kontekstis markantseid erinevusi. Naiste vähese osakaalu põhjuseks Riigikogus võib 
ennekõike pidada naiste vähest riikliku tasandi poliitika kogemust, aga välistada ei saa ka 
kõrget konkurentsi kandidaadiks astumisel või muid sotsiaalseid tegureid (nt ebasoodne 
töö- ja pereelu osakaal), mis võivad selgitada naiskandidaatide madalamat hulka 
kandidaatide populatsioonis. Viimatised asjaolud ei kuulu aga antud töö 
uurimisvaldkonda ning nõuavad eraldiseisvat uurimust.  
  
6 
 
Table of contents 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 7 
1. Determinants of electoral success: women in politics ........................................................ 10 
1.1. What affects the success of candidates: explaining the electoral outcome ................. 12 
1.2 Path for electoral success: the incentives of political actors and actors in political 
sphere ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….18 
1.2.1 Rational choice institutionalism and the rational-institutional logic of political 
actors and actors in political sphere .................................................................................... 21 
2. Design of analysis ............................................................................................................... 28 
2.1 The electoral rules of Estonia ...................................................................................... 29 
2.2 Hypotheses .................................................................................................................. 31 
2.3 Operationalisation of variables ................................................................................... 35 
3. Analysis............................................................................................................................... 41 
3.1 Success in votes: the vote share model ....................................................................... 42 
3.2 Getting elected: the seat-gaining model ...................................................................... 52 
3.3 Party lists: the national list placement model .............................................................. 56 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 68 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 72 
APPENDIX 1 .............................................................................................................................. 77 
 
  
7 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the core values of democracy is its strive for equality. This democratic ideal is 
necessary for ensuring the fair treatment and “demarginalization” of groups in efforts to 
provide opportunities to be heard for different actors within society. The unequal 
representation of women in politics can be considered threat to the egalitarian principle. 
Threats of underrepresentation can lead to non-inclusive policy-making, dissatisfaction, 
legitimacy crisis, and polarization of society (Zimmerman 1994, 4), which pertains the 
governing bodies to be representative of the society (Rule 1994, 15). Whilst there are 
several ways of ensuring the representation of certain groups in the political arena, the 
baseline of representation would still lie at the “level of presence” of representatives – on 
the descriptive stage.  
The lower share of female representatives as compared to their male counterparts has 
been observed worldwide (Women in national parliaments 2019). The numbers of women 
in governing bodies mirror the electoral success of female candidates and thus reflect the 
descriptive representation of women. The “visible” mode of representation assumes 
certain groups are represented when the representatives resemble those being represented 
(Pitkin 1967). The body of representatives is expected to mirror the society, which is 
important as presumably, some groups are exposed to experiences alien to other groups 
and hence can represent the interests of those groups better. At the same time – the 
unequal distribution of political power does not only hinder the interests of certain groups, 
but it also might set norms and values affecting both the preferences for candidates as 
well as the decisions to run for a seat in the first place (Fox & Lawless 2005, 646). Thus, 
the factors contributing to the composition of the pool of representatives are important to 
map not only for understanding the discrepancies in representation, but also for 
understanding what has constituted these differences.  
The electoral success of female candidates has been associated with formal rules, parties’ 
and political elites’ incentives, as well as candidates’ and voters’ motives and 
characteristics. Whilst institutions set a ground for the elective arena in the first place, it 
also sets “the rules of the game” which influences the political actors directly and 
indirectly. Some electoral rules can be considered strong predictors for increasing female 
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representation. At the same time, the growing numbers of female representatives have 
also been argued to go hand-in-hand with societal development, gender equality 
principles, and perceptions of gender roles, to name some (Inglehart et al. 2003; Pippa 
Norris 2004).  
The share of women at the governing (parliamentary) bodies has still remained notably 
low worldwide, being around 24% on average (Interparliamentary Union 2019). Whilst 
women expectedly compose about a half of the population of any given country, the 
interest and concern of the descriptive marginalisation of a social group with this density 
is reasoned. For Estonia, the number of female representatives has risen over the re-
independence period from 13 in the 1992 elections to 28 in the 2019 elections. Although 
the share of representatives is still not precisely mirroring the “reality”, the almost 30-
year-period has shown a slow but notable increase in the share of female representatives.  
The following thesis aims to shed a light on factors associated with the electoral success 
– that is, the success of gaining votes and getting elected – of the candidates. More 
specifically, it dwells on trying to map whether being female has an effect on the electoral 
success of candidates, and ultimately whether the discrepancies between the numbers of 
male and female representatives can be explained by the unfavouring behaviour of voters 
and parties against women. The case of Estonia is fruitful for the analysis as the 
proportional system, combination of open and closed lists, and availability of candidate-
level data allow to zone in on the success factors on the level of candidate. Furthermore, 
whilst an increase can be noted in the share of female representatives in Estonia, it further 
sheds a light onto what has attributed to this trend – or more so, whether anything has 
changed over the re-independence period. 
The upcoming thesis primarily operates within the context of institutional factors in trying 
to explain the electoral outcome, or more precisely, the electoral success of the candidate. 
The thesis approaches this goal in two tiers. First, the analytical framework provided by 
Mirjam Allik (2015) is used to replicate her analysis of candidates’ success also for the 
2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections. Applying the existing framework for new data 
adds new information onto the body of information about factors contributing to 
candidates’ success on the elections, which, in turn, would allow to assess  the effects of 
factors across elections, eventually creating an overview of the elements ensuring 
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electoral success of candidates over the period of Estonian re-independence until the latest 
elections. Whilst the literature on candidate-level research has mostly focused on single 
country or single elections (e.g. Prihatini 2019), or rarely on a small number of countries 
and elections (e.g. Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki & Crisp 2010), this addition to pre-existing 
information provided by Mirjam Allik (2015) allows to map the situation for Estonia from 
1992 to 2019, by providing the analysis also for 2015 and 2019 elections. Secondly, the 
relative availability of candidate-level data allows to add additional variables to the 
models, which are presumed to also affect the electoral chances of candidates. These 
variables are applied to vote-, seat-  and “position”-gaining models. This allows to test 
the effect of new factors that could be considered important in affecting the success of 
candidates, whether the success refers to share of votes, probability of getting elected, or 
the placement of candidates higher up in national lists.  
This thesis thus aims to study the effects of different variables contributing to the success 
of candidates in Estonian parliamentary elections of 2015 and 2019, and more 
specifically, zones into whether the gender-discrepancies among the pool of 
representatives could be produced by the negative effect of gender on the electoral success 
of the candidates or these differences are a product of other factors.  
The thesis has been presented in three main parts: 1) providing a theoretical background 
of the factors highlighted as contributing to the success of female candidates in the 
literature and mapping the theoretical approach to lay the ground for putting down 
hypotheses and interpreting the results of the analysis, 2) presenting an overview of 
research design and research decisions, including an overview of institutional context of 
the Estonia, as well as the introduction of data, methods of analysis, and research 
decisions with regards to the operationalization of variables, 3) presenting the results of 
the analysis.  
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1. Determinants of electoral success: women in politics 
 
The perceptions of equality first and foremost rely on the sense of justice derived from 
the recognition of balances and imbalances in resource distribution. Sense of inequalities 
in the society are “extracted” from the observations about the divisions of wealth, power, 
or other means – along the added disadvantages and advantages any misallocations can 
bring to affected groups and to society.   
Whilst the possession of resources can be seen as a mechanism of exerting control, those 
lacking the resources are perceived as disadvantaged. In the context of political 
representation and furthermore – in the context of representative democracy – the 
allocation of seats among different groups should reflect the distribution of power within 
society. From the egalitarian account of democracy, equal members of society should be 
governed by bodies in “discussion among equals” – the government should both mirror 
the balances in society as well as ensure the equality through the means of public 
affirmation (i.e. voting and elections) (Anderson 2009:214). The ideal of equality and 
striving for it is relevant not only in terms of ensuring societal justice, but it is also 
important in securing the quality of representation and establishing a set of (societal) rules 
further facilitating tendency to embed the principles of equality to norms. The equality is 
argued to facilitate deliberation and is embedded in the idea of inclusion, the latter of 
which is important in terms of constructing formal (and informal) norms (Hutt 2018:88) 
– through the process of voting and choosing representatives, people essentially establish 
the norms and regulations they themselves follow. Zoning further into inequalities among 
the distribution of political power resources, the gap between the shares of female and 
male representatives in governing bodies across the world refers to the unequal 
distribution of political power. If some participants of the social and political sphere are 
disadvantaged in the process of decision-making, the power is imposed on these groups 
(i.e. the decisions are made for them not by them). The imbalance of the “share” of 
political resources affects the social norms, which in turn can explain the inequalities in 
the wider social sphere. Furthermore, the inclusion of the groups can alter the processes 
and decision-making, enriching the political arena by adding the perspective-diversity or 
(re-)establishing the core value of democracy. For example, the presence of women in the 
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political arena – even from the standpoint of descriptive representation – is seen important 
for increasing political trust (Ulbig 2007), political activity, deliberation, and engagement 
(Atkeson 2003; Wolbrecht & Campbell 2007), all being important democratic virtues. 
The positive impact of female representatives on political outcomes (i.e. pushing through 
certain “feminine” policies, for example when it comes to childcare or ecological 
questions) have been noted regarding different policy concerns (e.g. (Mavisakalyan & 
Tarverdi 2019; Quamruzzaman & Lange 2016). Inequality in the political arena might be 
detrimental to the quality of decision-making or inclusion of certain social groups.  
Although the “underrepresentation” of women has been referred to when talking about 
their electoral success – or the lack of it –, the notion of equality should be approached 
from more specific terms. By looking at the share of female and male representatives 
across different terms of Riigikogu since the re-independence, the share of female 
representatives has steadily risen, but stayed below 30% even at its peak in 2019 elections. 
Although the share of female representatives is notably lower compared to male 
representatives and female candidates have constantly received less votes than their male 
counterparts, these differences can be accounted by the combination of several factors, 
imposed by several “institutions”.  
As the voters construct the political norms through the representatives they choose, the 
imbalance of the distribution of political resources can, to some extent, reflect and 
reinforce the bias of voters through the “institution” of culture. Simultaneously, the 
representatives the voters have chosen and the political elite they have “legitimised” can 
also impose their agenda. The pool of representatives and thus the access to political 
resources can be undermined by inner-party processes. Whilst voters can decide on a 
desired candidate based on personal preferences or the characteristics of the candidate, 
the role of the party institutions should not be overlooked. The decisions that have been 
made “for the voters” already during inner-party decision-making processes precede and 
thus to some extent limit the choices of the voters. Additionally, the abovementioned 
actors are bound by the institutional limitations. The decisions parties or voters can make 
are limited by the electoral rules and regulations. Even though institutional factors can 
alter the electoral outcome, they do not account for political consequences – whilst they 
have indirect effect, parties and voters have direct influence over the political outcomes 
(Colomer 2011, 13–14).  
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1.1 What affects the success of candidates: explaining the electoral outcome  
 
The problem of female underrepresentation in politics – the observed inequalities in the 
distribution of political power and the noted gender gaps – have sparked academic interest 
and produced numerous studies already since 1970s (Fox & Lawless 2011, 59–60). The 
electoral success of women has been primarily discussed in terms of their descriptive 
representation. The “numeric” representation of women is the most direct evidence 
indicating prevailing inequalities in the political sphere. Thus, the underrepresentation 
and furthermore, the electoral success of the candidates has been studied in terms of 
“observable” (numeric) changes in the pool of representatives, how well it mirrors the 
society, and whether some social groups and their possibilities are potentially 
undermined.  
When it comes to academic research, outcome-influencing factors have widely been 
approached by explaining the electoral success through formal institutional effects, but 
also by cultural and social factors. Institutional factors as formal mechanisms of outcome-
altering have been in focus of most of them. The emphasis on formal regulations is 
justified by the “intrusiveness” of their implementation and effects: institutions can be 
considered more open to adjustments to distort the electoral outcome in favour of certain 
social groups when compared to cultural perceptions which are hard to change, especially 
in short term (Nkala & Ogunnubi 2015, 135).  For example, the effect of electoral systems 
has been studied in large-N cross-country studies, where the general “consensus” noted 
throughout academic literature has been the favouring effect of some electoral systems 
over others (e.g. the positive effect of proportional system in comparison with 
majoritarian system), the indirect effect of formal regulations (e.g. district magnitude, 
ballot system, electoral formulas), and direct affirmative regulations for enhancing 
women’s electoral chances (Ballington 1998; Norris 2004; Paxton, Hughes, & Painter 
2010; Rule 1994, 18; Shugart 1994, 31).  
However, cross-country studies can be argued to be prone to generalising the effects of 
different factors, overestimating some factors whilst underestimating the effects of local 
political sphere and culture. Furthermore, the research decisions in terms of simplifying 
the variables for operationalization to ensure the generalizability of phenomena foster the 
over- or underestimation of some effects. For example, whilst the positive effect of gender 
13 
 
quotas is considered to be common knowledge, the effect of the implementation of 
different types of quotas on the electoral outcome can widely differ across countries, with 
party quotas being more effective in established countries when compared to less 
developed ones, to bring out some of the differences (Rosen 2017). Whilst the effect of 
proportional system has been widely regarded as facilitating women’s chances, their 
effect stands out in comparison with other systems – Norris (2004) noted female 
candidates were almost twice as likely to succeed in getting elected in PR systems 
compared to majoritarian systems, although the importance of other intervening factors 
(such as district magnitude, use of quota regulations, party incentives etc) were warned 
against being disregarded – but the differences within countries with proportional system 
still prevail. Attempts to minimize the effects of generalisations when measuring the 
influence of different institutional factors and explaining the distinctions across similar 
countries have been made by shifts to comparing the differences within similar electoral 
systems, minimising the overall variety of observed cases but still comparing quite a large 
number of them. The effect of formal and informal elements affecting the outcome and 
favouring effects for certain candidates can be argued to be more dependent on contextual 
factors and how different means regarded as conventional in facilitating women’s chances 
operate conditionally (i.e. in combination with different factors and dependent on the 
“level” of implementation) (Schmidt 2009). For example, with reference to previous 
article, the effect of quotas in increasing the electoral chances of female candidates was 
primarily seen for placement mandates and had little difference in the effect of facilitating 
women’s chances as compared to other “conventional” qualities of female-friendly 
systems, such as proportional electoral system – thus, the generalizations about the 
efficiency of some factors in generating better changes for women should be approached 
with a degree of criticism.  
The aggregated effects are important in framing the understanding of different elements 
affecting the electoral outcomes. Still, the political, social and cultural climate, alongside 
the formal institutional regulations differ even within the group of similar countries. 
Hence, the emergence of numerous studies can be observed concentrating on a single 
country and a small number of elections with an aim to provide a better overview of the 
causal inferences for explaining the success chances of candidates specifically accounting 
the effects of political climate and contextual factors. With a candidate as a unit of 
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analysis, large-N studies still prevail. The focus on candidate-level factors has in turn 
facilitated the single-country and -election approach, as the problems with availability 
and volume of the data limit research.   
The literature on women’s electoral chances have undergone several shifts over the recent 
decades. Whilst one shift could be noted in terms of the units of analysis, another one can 
be observed with regards to explaining the changes in the pool of representatives. 
Although the share of female representatives has generally stayed low worldwide as 
already mentioned above, there still is a slow but steady increase in the number of women 
in parliamentary bodies. This increase has been studied in terms of the effects of factors 
regarded as “women-friendly”, where their potential for securing the success of women 
has been assessed. Whilst the effect of proportional system and quotas were regarded as 
positively impacting the electoral chances of women, the effect of democracy has been 
regarded important for the stability and sustainability for the constant growth in the 
numbers of female representatives (Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010). Also, with an 
introduction of gender quotas both on legislative and party level and the changes (or the 
lack of them) for female representation they are expected to bring upon, perhaps the most 
widely researched institutional factors affecting women’s representation over the last 
years have been affirmative regulative actions implemented both by states and parties 
(Bhalotra, Clots‐Figueras & Iyer 2018, 1846). The law-embedded quotas for ensuring the 
representation of certain under-represented groups are suggested to be the most effective 
measures for moving towards proportionality (Inglehart et al. 2003, 7), especially when 
the cultural and societal values and attitudes of both selectorate and electorate support 
these regulations (Norris 2004, 184, 190). These actions differ by the effect they have on 
penetrating the barriers for women’s inclusion and thus naturally have different 
mechanisms affecting the outcome. Whilst state level quotas regulate the possibilities of 
women in formal terms, whereby the regulations are equally implemented for all 
participants in the system, party quotas are exclusive to certain parties and directly 
regulate the potential of getting elected for each individual candidate within the party. 
Furthermore, the quotas differ by whether the restrictions are imposed on the positioning 
of candidates or the number of them, as well as whether the failure to follow the rules are 
penalized, to bring out some of their distinctions. For example, the quotas regulating the 
number of female candidates do not necessarily introduce new female candidates to 
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political positions in some cases, but rather might spike the number of female candidates 
from among whom the experienced candidates are still preferred (Górecki & Kukołowicz 
2014). At the same time, whilst the success of female candidates is positively associated 
with the re-entrance of female candidates even in cases where regulative actions have not 
been implemented to alter the electoral outcome, the entry was observed to be even more 
discouraging to new female candidates who now faced competition with strong and 
experienced female candidates (Bhalotra, Clots‐Figueras & Iyer 2018). Thus, the 
introduction of affirmative action regulations as well as other facilitating institutional 
qualities (e.g. proportional system) alone fail to explain the poor electoral success of 
women, and in trying to explain the lack of effect, other party and candidate specific 
factors are turned to – studying gender and the occasional inefficiency of the positive 
discrimination policies has further highlighted gender alone is not sufficient factor in 
explaining the gender gaps. Candidate-level factors are thus crucial for explaining the 
prevailing discrepancies in electoral success between sexes and this is also reflected in 
the literature of the recent years. For example, the electoral success of women has been 
studied in terms of their probability of getting elected when accounting both potential 
factors influencing voter behaviour (e.g. the effect of education, religion, income) as well 
as candidates’ qualities, testing the effect of political and professional background, 
placement on lists, and age in new democracies with established gender quotas – and 
unsurprisingly, candidate-level factors (and primarily the experience of the candidate) 
have been proved to yield significant explanations of the electoral outcome (Prihatini 
2019). Voters’ background did not provide evidence of undermining the chances of 
female candidates to get elected for some cases (Prihatini 2019), although the perceptions 
of candidates in terms of their non-political qualities have differed among men and 
women for other cases (Berggren, Jordahl & Poutvaara 2010). Incumbency has been 
noted as relevant for electoral success as a facilitating indicator, increasing women’s 
chances of election as well as for bettering positions of the candidates on the electoral 
lists as an additional factor supporting gender quotas (Shair-Rosenfield 2012). 
Incumbency has also been highlighted as a supporting factor for ensuring female 
candidates’ success throughout the articles zoning in on the success-factors of women, 
even though political experience has been deemed beneficial for all candidates. When 
looking at the effects of incumbency itself, the studies of the impact of gender and 
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incumbency on party popularity have noted that female incumbents do not “undermine” 
party’s electoral popularity when compared to male incumbents – voters are not 
necessarily biased against female candidates, rather their electoral chances are supressed 
by parties, who tend to nominate women for more difficult positions, for example by 
assigning them lower seats (Esteve-Volart & Bagues 2012; Murray 2008). This bias 
towards women is argued to strengthen the qualities of female candidates, eventually 
making them “stronger” candidates than their male counterparts and resulting in electoral 
success (Fulton 2012), which could provide evidence for why female candidates do better 
than their male competitors in some occasions.  
Experience has been studied in different terms. The effect of local political experience as 
a “precondition” for national level experience has been studied and found important in 
explaining the success of the candidates (Tavits 2010), but the local experience and its 
effect on electoral outcome in national elections have also been studied with regards to 
the size of district and its potential of increasing personal vote gain (Put & Maddens 
2015). Whilst experience has been studied it terms of holding a political seat as a binary 
indicator of legislative status (Prihatini 2019; Shair-Rosenfield 2012), mostly brushing 
over the differences of candidates’ experiences within non-incumbent groups, attempts 
have been made to differentiate the effect of legislative candidacy experience from 
electoral experience on candidates’ list position as a precondition of electoral success 
both in terms of recent and cumulative experience, and again, female incumbents were 
not stripped from better positions, providing further evidence that women were not 
undermined when compared to men with similar qualities (Chiru & Popescu 2017). 
The positioning of the candidates in the electoral lists has an effect of potential for success 
on its own. In the context of limited knowledge of politics or many competing parties and 
candidates, the tendency to vote for candidates at the top of the lists – or phrased 
differently – the success of top-list candidates in terms of getting elected or receiving 
votes (Lutz 2010; Marcinkiewicz 2014) – accounts for the lack of success of female 
candidates when they are declined from top positions. Political experience as well as 
party-level factors, such as organization, ideology and openness to welcome newcomers 
has been linked to facilitating female candidates’  position on electoral lists (Kunovich 
2003). The discrepancies of how party elite perceives the chances of female candidates 
are also argued to be mediating factors for facilitating women’s participation and 
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therefore electoral chances (Sanbonmatsu 2006). Parties’ characteristics, with an 
emphasis on their structural and organizational composition, can indirectly alter the 
electoral outcome – for example, the level of centralization of the party and the candidate 
selection mechanism can produce more favourable conditions for female candidates 
(Atmor, Hazan & Rahat 2011, 27). 
Apart from institutional factors, cultural and social tendencies have been studied in efforts 
to explain tendencies in women’s electoral outcome. For example, public perceptions of 
female leader’s roles have been deemed as important for enhancing the willingness of 
women to run for elections, parties to select the candidates, and voters to elect them – 
furthermore, the decreasing gender gap with regards to perceptions of gender roles among 
younger generation could be positively associated with women’s success (Norris & 
Inglehart 2001). Women’s negative self-perception, on the other hand, prevents women 
from entering the politics and thus allowing the discrepancies to emerge among the pool 
of candidates and ultimately among the pool of representatives (Fox & Lawless 2011).  
Exposure to politics, upbringing, sense of efficacy and ambitions as well as the social 
status (i.e. marital status, children) among other criteria have been studied to determine 
the factors relevant for even becoming a candidate (Fox & Lawless 2005), as well as the 
effect of local culture and patriarchy in creating the perceptions of the roles of women 
can be detrimental to female candidates and their potential for success (Chuki & Turner 
2017).  
Other non-political candidate-specific elements have also been studied, more so in the 
field of political psychology. When in terms of formal rules and primary party incentives 
the studies have focused on candidates’ political “virtues”, the non-political factors for 
success have also been zoned into. For example, the effect of perceptions of the 
attractiveness and likeability of candidates are not alien to the academic literature trying 
to explain the success of candidates. Attractive candidates are favoured as perceptions of 
political-position-beneficial personal traits have been imposed on them, which makes 
them seem more approachable, visible, and competent (Banducci et al 2008) – but at the 
same time, the personalisation of politics can harvest prevailing gender stereotypes and 
be detrimental to female candidates’ success. This has not found strong proof in recent 
academic studies:  the effect of physical attractiveness on candidates’ vote share was 
deemed important for mayoral elections, especially for very competitive ones even with 
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other variables controlled, however, strong evidence of the unfavouring effect of 
attractiveness on women’s electoral success was not found (Jäckle & Metz 2017; Rosar, 
Beckers & Klein 2012). In terms of proportional systems, physical attractiveness was 
found favouring for their relative vote success for non-incumbent candidates for both 
genders, but not for women or men exclusively (Berggren, Jordahl & Poutvaara 2010).  
The research on female underrepresentation has explained the “phenomenon” with 
institutional, party, and candidate-specific factors, which directly or indirectly alter the 
behaviour and choices of voters and thus result in electoral outcomes – and the potential 
inequalities in the distribution of political positions. The barriers for female candidates 
can also be studied at different stages of candidacy process – for example, the factors 
influencing candidates’ decisions and opportunities provided by the party for even 
running for candidacy can alter the pool of candidates and thus the pool of potential 
representatives. Hence, the translation of women from the members of parties to 
candidates and only then to representatives encompasses variety of elements that can alter 
the electoral outcome and composition of governing bodies. However, whilst the electoral 
outcome is directly influenced by the institutional constraints, the actors of political 
sphere also operate within these regulations, adjusting their own incentives with the 
constraints. These incentives, in turn, can not be disregarded when trying to explain the 
electoral outcome of candidates and female candidates specifically. 
 
1.2 Path for electoral success: the incentives of political actors and actors in 
political sphere 
 
The political outcome is influenced by several formal and informal factors leading the 
decisions of different political actors. On the widest level, the electoral outcome is 
regulated by the state-level formal factors, referring to the effect of electoral rules – 
electoral systems, ballot types, district magnitude, threshold, or even state-induced rules 
for positive action (e.g. quotas, reserved seats) – which can alter the electoral outcome 
from the standpoint of equality in representation. At the same time, the decisions 
regarding translating members to candidates and deciding their chances for electoral 
success by, for example, list-positioning or campaign-financing, are party-level decisions, 
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where the values, leadership, their motivations, and the organizational structure of the 
party determines the pool of potential representatives and can, thus, affect the 
composition of representatives. Lastly, the factors related to candidate’s vote-gaining 
assets can be brought out. The “candidate-level” factors refer to indicators that explain 
the success of the candidate at least partly by their individual characteristics, background, 
and experience (Cain et al 1987 cited by Riera 2011, 59). As an informal set of societal 
norms, also culture, socio-demographic factors, perceptions of gender roles, and risks for 
women can alter both the electoral outcome as well as influence the incentives of 
becoming a candidate. 
Whilst these levels of factors affecting the success of female candidates can be 
differentiated, it should be noted that these factors are still intertwined and not exhaustive. 
It has been argued that formal rules, party and elite incentives, socio-demographical 
dynamics, and role perceptions can be interrelated and altogether affect the potential for 
the success of candidates (Eder, Fortin-Rittberger & Kroeber 2016, 371; Rule 1994, 15). 
State-level factors can be considered as basis for parties’, candidates’ as well as voters’ 
decisions. For example, the ballot structure can affect party motives for including diverse 
pool of candidates – whilst party-ballots theoretically introduce more diversity among the 
candidates due to social pressures and potential for electoral penalty, candidate-ballots 
are generally free of these “threats” and parties are not held collectively accountable, 
leaving more room for potential bias (Norris 2004, 14). At the same time, it is strategic 
to include well-known candidates at the top of the lists as they can pull more votes, for 
voters to vote for them as they can assign certain value to the candidate based on their 
political experience or social position, and for candidate to run for elections as their 
position is likely to minimise the risk of not getting elected.  
The behaviour of political actors can be analysed by employing different theoretical 
approaches. For example, the cultural values and perceptions of the roles of men and 
women in society can alter the incentives, nomination and selection of female candidates 
and are analysed by employing cultural and sociological modernization models. It is 
presumed the existing governing bodies do not only reflect prevailing values in the 
society, but also can recreate the understanding of which qualities and characteristics the 
successful candidate has to have (Norris 2004, 184). The lower success of female 
candidates is explained by the societal norms – for example, the share of female 
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representatives has been lower compared to male representatives and thus the social 
understanding of how the governing body should look like might be skewed. Cultural 
modernization theories argue the perceptions and values within societies are resulting 
from human development (Inglehart et al 2003; Norris 2004, 184–85; Zimmerman 1994, 
4). Even though the electoral systems are believed to enhance the chances of female 
candidates to become elected, the differences between systems were not so prevalent 
before the end of 20th century, allowing to argue any institutional rule might have 
interacted with other cultural developments (education, labour market and workforce 
structure, roles and inclusion of different social groups etc), resulting in less exclusive 
and more egalitarian choices for political actors (Norris 2004, 203).  
Other approaches focus more on formal institutions. The behaviour of (political) actors is 
driven by self-interest, which in turn, is affected by the incentives and limitations of the 
political regulatory sphere and context where the action takes place – institutional context 
is essential for assigning some actors interests in analysing politics (Weyland 2002, 58). 
Rational choice approach has proven to explain and provide a good basis for analysing 
political decision-making as it relies on the instrumental interests of actors which – even 
when it does not necessarily hold for each individual actor – describes the incentives of 
the larger group of actors as a whole in competitive arena (Norris 2004, 13; Weyland 
2002, 59). It is a beneficial tool especially for analysing political actors’ behaviour, as 
their actions are generally led by reliance and altering of the behaviour based collecting 
information and learning (e.g. collecting information about voter preferences, relying on 
previous election outcomes in trying to assess the potential of winning, voters holding 
incumbents accountable for failing to conform their expectations at the office), and 
because the aggregation of actors’ behaviour balances out inconsistencies or deviances in 
the rationality assumption (Tsebelis 1990, 33–37).  
For understanding the strategies of political actors’ behaviour, forming hypotheses and 
explaining the outcomes, rational choice institutionalism approach will be elaborated on 
further in this thesis in attempts to lay a basis for the interpretation of the results of 
analytical models. 
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1.2.1 Rational choice institutionalism and the rational-institutional logic of 
political actors and actors in political sphere 
 
The institutionalist approach encompasses analysing institutions and their effect 
(Diermeier 2015, 18) - the focus of institutionalist theories lies in addressing which role 
and to what extent institutions have in affecting certain outcomes. In the context of 
electoral success, institutions and the “logic” of the system itself can be perceived as 
rationale for both party and voter decision-making.  
Taking the institutionalist approach, the focus of explaining the electoral outcome and 
success of certain candidates lies in the choices and competition of actors influenced by 
institutions (Diermeier 2015, 16; Tsebelis 1990, 46). Rational choice institutionalism 
“explains the observed variation in political behaviour by stressing the incentives and 
constraints created by the specific institutional rules that political actors face”(Weyland 
2002, 59). The emphasis of rational choice approach is on the limitations that have been 
posed on rational actors within the society – namely by the institutions of the society – 
which affect the behaviour of actors and therefore also the societal-electoral outcome 
(Tsebelis 1990, 40). Institutions refer to the formal regulations and elements of societal 
sphere (laws, procedures etc) (Alasuutari 2015, 165), which act as “institutional 
parameters” affecting actors’ political choices in hopes of reaching their interests and 
goals (Weyland 2002, 60). Their effect would appear mainly on the electoral outcome 
and is expected to influence the political outcome indirectly through the behaviour of 
political actors (as illustrated in Figure 1, pp 23) – regulations affect voters’ and parties’ 
behaviour in elections directly, and, in turn, parties’ decisions (e.g. candidate selection) 
affect voters’ decisions indirectly, ultimately “resulting” in electoral outcome affected by 
the rational behaviour of actors in political sphere. Institutions serve the interests of 
political actors and are created and maintained to serve these interests (Tsebelis 1990, 8). 
They are perceived as game rules ensuring personal interests of political actors (or more 
so those who are in position to control the institutions) in a sphere of “collective action” 
(Weyland 2002, 60). 
This approach highlights the interests of political actors. It is presumed the incentive for 
political action is electoral success. According to rational choice institutionalism, the 
preferences of the participants of political sphere are set and the behaviour should be led 
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by the idea of maximising the outcome, based on presumed knowledge of other actors’ 
behaviour and to avoid penalty (Alasuutari 2015, 165; Tsebelis 1990, 30; Weyland 2002, 
58–59). The actors are expected to rely on their options and probabilities of gaining 
success. Their assessments are based on previous information and assessing new changes 
in the environment (Tsebelis 1990, 29). Assessments of political success are based on the 
previous elections as well as the predicted effect any new situations have brought. The 
actors will then adapt their behaviour to ensure the outcome that would increase their 
potential for success. It is also presumed actors have no motivation to deliberately deviate 
from their expected actions – deviation in the course of action should be attributed to the 
irrationality of the previous course of action (Tsebelis 1990, 41). The actors that do not 
follow the “logic” of instrumental rationality would be left out in competition where other 
actors tend to be rational, which would eliminate the former group and further perpetuate 
rationality and strategic electoral practices (Norris 2004, 13).  Political decisions of the 
actors – especially in competitive context – are thus expected to be led by the assumption 
of furthering one’s career (Weyland 2002, 58). The collective goals (such as those 
pursued by parties as units) are presumed to follow the same logic of instrumental 
rationality, where the end goal would be maximizing party’s success (Norris 2004, 13) – 
the incentives of political actors are instrumental and led by personal goals, and both 
institutional and individual actors aim for reaching the best possible outcome for their 
goals (Tsebelis 1990, 6). At the same time, whilst the choices of political actors and their 
outcomes are led by the assumption of rationality, it does not mean they should be 
interpreted as efficient per se (Tsebelis 1990, 26). Since the outcome is a result of 
knowingly made decisions of different political actors, it is expected to be a result of the 
optimal choices of actors. 
In terms of the topic of women’s electoral success, the incentives of behaviour of different 
political actors – and actors involved with political sphere – are what can be considered 
the underlying decisions steering the success of women in political sphere. From the 
standpoint of strategic and rational approach, for example, proportional electoral systems 
are believed to benefit female candidates as parties are more motivated to present all-
inclusive lists for multimember constituencies in efforts to appeal to wider electorate and 
prevent electoral penalties, have higher incentives to adopt affirmative strategies 
favouring more equal distribution of positions due to decreased electoral risk, but women 
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also stand better chances as incumbents are less likely to rerun for a position with 
increased competition and – in combination with preferential voting – electoral penalties  
(Karvonen 2011, 133; Norris 2004, 188–90). Furthermore, district magnitude can be 
argued to be beneficial for women not only because higher magnitude decreases 
competition for votes and seats, but also since parties can nominate more candidates they 
are more inclined to include newcomers – especially when incumbents sense they stand 
less chance for maximising their personal vote gain due to distribution of votes across the 
many candidates or when they have been penalized by the electorate due to weak 
responsiveness to district voters (Katz 1994, 99–100; Norris 2004, 232; Rule 1994, 18). 
This enhances the opportunities for women who have generally held political positions in 
less occasions.  
 
Figure 1. The effect of institutional factors on the incentives of actors and electoral 
outcome (modified from  Norris 2004, 8).  
However, the effect of ballot system on political actors’ rational behaviour and thus the 
potential for female candidates to succeed in electoral competition can be considered very 
influential as it regulates the paths of possible behaviour of parties and voters perhaps the 
most directly (when not including the effect of quotas). Based on the choices made 
available for voters in different types of ballots, each of these ballot types are believed to 
alter the chances for female candidates differently. For example, preference-ballots 
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harvest the potential benefits the candidates offer for parties’ success – inclusion of the 
variety of candidates is encouraged and since the candidate is responsible for their 
personal success and voters can rearrange the rankings of candidates parties have 
proposed, parties face minimal risk for including female candidates to open lists (Shugart 
1994, 37). Whereas for party lists, parties have a high incentive to include a variety of 
candidates from among different social groups to avoid electoral penalty and attract 
variety of voters from respective districts (Norris 2004, 14; Rule 1994, 18), although 
parties may exert exclusive requirements for candidacy (e.g. membership status, loyalty) 
(Atmor, Hazan & Rahat 2011, 24), which can alter electoral outcome and give heads-up 
to incumbent, successful – “established” – candidates, again disregarding newcomers and 
thus often women. From the candidate specific qualities, political experience has been 
highlighted as one of the core success factors of a candidate.  Incumbency is attractive 
both for parties aiming to maximise their possible share of votes within institutional 
limitations as well as to voters seeking to secure their voice to be heard. Incumbents are 
also expected to have personal incentives to respond to the “demand” of other actors. 
When a candidate has been a member of governing bodies, they already have some 
support from the electorate thanks to their record of governing experience, as well as they 
usually can enjoy the financial and public benefits due to their position (i.e. the benefits 
provided by and to the successful party or the publicity the candidate gets when being 
selected, being part of the working processes of governing bodies and having their name 
exposed to the public in formal documents or even party lists) (Norris 2004, 182; 
Zimmerman 1994, 9). Incumbents also may have an access to their personal staff who 
would be at least partly responsible for taking care of candidate’s promotion and possible 
re-election as well as they can use some of their official activities and finances for 
campaigning purposes (Zimmerman 1994, 9). Whilst political experience is beneficial for 
individual candidates, non-incumbents face hard time reaching the office. Given the 
constraints posed by electoral rules and expected rational behaviour from political actors 
to respond to these limitations without undermining their chance of success, incumbents 
are prioritised and non-incumbents often placed on “marginal” positions. This does not 
only limit the possibilities for non-incumbents, but indirectly also for social groups that 
might not be represented among the majority of incumbents. Candidate level 
characteristics thus can both offer explanations for electoral outcome as well as shed a 
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light on the factors behind distribution of political resources. When institutional 
constraints are set for candidate level factors – such as the use of term limitations – the 
chances of electoral success increase not only for non-incumbents, but expectedly also 
the social groups that have been underrepresented (e.g. women or ethnic groups) 
(Zimmerman 1994, 9).  
Candidates have limited resources when it comes to promoting their candidacy. It is thus 
expected that politicians – as well as presumably the parties – prioritize their chances 
based on expected outcome. When candidates or parties stand a good chance of getting 
elected, they have more incentives to invest their time and other resources for trying to 
gain electoral support. From the perspective of vote-seeking rationality, it is thus expected 
that the individual decisions of the candidates are led by the institutional composition – 
based on the type of ballots, for example, the candidate can adopt more district- and voter-
based promotion strategy in efforts to maximize individual vote share, or, on the other 
hand, maximize their chances of election by focusing on appealing to inner-party 
decision-makers and promoting programmatic values (Norris 2004, 13). It is up to 
candidates whether they tend to focus on party values, leader- and membership, or 
concentrate their focus on the electorate (Norris 2004, 233), but it can be presumed the 
decision is dependent on the chances of getting elected purely based on the votes (e.g. 
from open lists) compared to getting elected through favourable position in successful 
party’s list (Karvonen 2011, 132). 
The strategy of list-composing gives an insight to explaining the electoral outcomes. 
Whilst the formal institutional regulations state and limit the decisions parties make in 
choosing their candidates and structuring the lists, the vote- and seat-seeking incentive 
alongside the rationality clause may be detrimental to certain candidates or candidates 
representing some social groups. Since the information about the preferences of the voters 
is limited, the parties tend to opt for “working formulas” in selecting and composing the 
candidate lists (Norris 2004, 234). A risk-minimizing strategy is to choose and promote 
candidates that have already proven to be successful or who share similarities with those 
who are successful – this rationality assumption is also used to explain why the pool of 
candidates might be disproportionately representative of certain social groups or clusters 
at the expense of others (Norris 2004, 13).  
26 
 
Whilst formal rules can increase the opportunity for electoral success for women, it does 
not mean women necessarily get elected – this is, in turn, dependent on the incentives and 
series of actions of different political actors. Electoral rules can, however, positively alter 
the outcome for the benefit of women should the social “context” be unfavourable – and, 
vice versa, the public choices of voters can alter the results, to some extent, regardless the 
procedural limitations (Rule 1994, 16).  
Rationality assumption does not have to be the leading factor for all political decisions, 
but the rational choice approach should be considered beneficial tool for explaining the 
behaviour of political actors when their incentives and relations within a political sphere 
can be established. Although setting a good basis for comparisons by providing an 
analytical framework for assessing the incentives (and outcomes) of political behaviour 
of different actors, rational choice approach to institutionalism theory still poses some 
limitations. In fact, the conditions of pure rationality are argued to be harder to meet than 
those of non-rationality (Tsebelis 1990, 23–25). The comparative and universalist nature 
of rational choice institutionalism comes from the simplification of the processes and 
motives explaining the behaviour of political actors which can overemphasise or 
underestimate the role of some factors at the expense of others (Weyland 2002, 62), fail 
to explain the paths when multiple optimal behaviours are presented, when actors are 
willing to deviate from the rationality-principle to secure their values, or when it comes 
to “crisis” situations where actions are likely not led by the call for rationality (Tsebelis 
1990, 28,30,38; Weyland 2002, 73). This “simplification” can also overlook the power 
culture, norms, and other societal values have exerted over both institutions and the 
behaviour of political actions (Weyland 2002, 74). However, whilst the conditions of 
rationality are hard (or even impossible) to transfer to actors’ behaviours in the “real 
world”, it is still perceived as an useful approach to reveal the factors steering some 
phenomena under research (Tsebelis 1990, 32).  
Rational choice institutionalism approach has been taken as basis for trying to explain the 
electoral outcome of candidates as well as for relying on the notion of rationality and 
institutional constrains when mapping the elements of interest when testing the effects of 
different factors. The use of rational choice institutionalism approach for framework and 
hypothesis formation is suitable for given thesis as no cross-country comparisons are 
made, the institutional settings have remained unchangeable over the period analysed, 
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and the stability of political and party system allows to presume the actors have 
established certain strategies leading their political behaviour based on information from 
previous elections.  
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2. Design of analysis 
 
The studies focusing on the electoral chances of female candidates have observed their 
success mainly in terms of the electoral results of the candidates, but also based on their 
positions on electoral lists, which would allow to assess the potential biases of parties 
against women. Vote share of the candidates is commonly referred to as an indicator of 
candidate’s success, where logit transformation has been used in some of them for dealing 
with the variances between vote shares (e.g. Marcinkiewicz 2014). Success is also 
referred to in terms of the  probability of getting elected (e.g. Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki 
& Crisp 2010). However, the approach to studying list positions can differ, with the 
dependent variable referring to “winning seats” (e.g. Esteve-Volart & Bagues 2012), “top 
seats” (e.g. Kunovich 2003) and “bottom seat” (e.g. Marcinkiewicz 2014), or “win 
margin” (e.g. Fiva & Røhr 2018) to name some possibilities. The use of binary variables 
can be explained by the attempt to account differences in what electable seats are for a 
party – the popularity of the party determines the positions that could be regarded viable 
and secure for getting elected and thus it differs for each party. However, binary approach 
(e.g. top positions) disregards a lot of information (Allik 2015) and does not explain the 
situation for candidates in lower positions. Thus, continuous variable for party list rank 
might be preferred to see whether values and strategies of parties reflect in the 
associations of different candidate-specific variables. 
As previously mentioned, a shift of focusing on single countries or elections can be 
observed in the academic literature regarding the works aiming to map the factors 
influencing the electoral success of candidates. However, studying the effects of factors 
on electoral outcome on the level of candidate faces practical limitations in light of 
difficulties of retrieving data, which can further limit the interests of study and force the 
effects of some variables to be studied on more general level (i.e. when there is little 
chance for retrieving candidate-specific data). At the same time, with candidate as a unit 
of analysis and usually a single country or election under study, the generalisations of 
effects that might arise when comparing different countries, electoral-formal and socio-
cultural environments and elections can be avoided, which in turn allows to interpret the 
results in certain institutional and political contexts. When the limitations of data 
collection are overcome, the candidate-level analysis expectedly offers valuable approach 
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to studying the effects of different factors on electoral outcome, allowing to explain these 
outcomes on the level of “causal mechanisms” (Allik 2015). Furthermore, candidate-level 
analysis still usually provides a pool of candidates big enough for being able to apply 
quantitative methods for analysing these effects and drawing meaningful insights based 
on the results of statistical models.  
Candidate-level analysis has been opted for in this thesis. The selection of elections for 
given thesis was somewhat “predetermined” by the previous work done by Mirjam Allik 
as it was aimed to test the analytical framework as well as the effect of additional variables 
on recent data to fill in on the information of the situation in Estonian “electoral sphere”. 
At the same time, the peculiarities (e.g. the use of both open and closed lists) and the 
stability of Estonian electoral system made it interesting and viable country to study. 
Simultaneously, it should be acknowledged that primarily the wide range of available 
data as well as the “approachable” number of candidates (i.e. the number of observations 
is high enough to provide meaningful insights of the effects but small enough to manage 
the data collection with relative ease) makes Estonian elections extremely valuable for 
candidate-level research. 
 
2.1 The electoral rules of Estonia 
 
Estonia has a proportional system with a form of casting preference ballots. Voters can 
cast a single vote for a candidate, who can be an affiliated party member, run in a party 
list or as an independent candidate. When a vote is cast for a candidate that is running for 
elections in a party list, the voter simultaneously votes for a party. There are no legal 
state-level restrictions governing the proportion of candidates, reserved mandates or other 
means of legal positive discrimination. With an exception of Centre Party which uses zip-
lock method for distributing the top 12 position on national lists, Estonian parties have 
not officially included party quotas in efforts to regulate the composition of lists or pool 
of candidates.  
Seat distribution is determined in three tiers. The voters exert direct preferential vote over 
determining which candidate receives personal mandate: the candidate who receives more 
votes than district quota will be elected. Preferential element is also apparent for assigning 
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district mandates: seats are allocated based on each 0,75 Hare quota the party list has 
collected, where the candidates with highest vote shares (that constitute at least 10% of 
Hare quota) in the districts will be elected. Lastly, compensatory mandates are allocated 
to candidates based on the party’s vote totals, where candidates ranked higher up the party 
list will get elected. Although the compensatory mandates are determined by closed party 
list principles and are dependent on the party’s total vote share,  it is argued that the third 
tier also composes preferential vote element – namely, the candidate has to surpass a 
threshold of 5% of district’s Hare quota to get elected through compensatory mandate 
(Karvonen 2011, 126). At the same time, although the information about parties’ closed 
list composition is made available prior the elections, these lists are not showcased to 
voters in polling stations or in other means of voting, and thus the voters’ effect (or voter 
bias) would be limited in explaining the election of certain candidates when it comes to 
closed lists (Allik 2015, 435).  
Observing the factors for candidate success in Estonia is especially interesting because of 
the two types of lists that determine the election success: open and closed lists. These lists 
should have inherently different effect for parties’, candidates’, and voters’ incentives in 
explaining their political behaviour. Colomer (2011, 9–11) lists Estonia as a system with 
“semi-open” ballot systems, which theoretically gives a voter multiple choices – as the 
distribution of mandates is made on different levels – even though only one vote is cast. 
This semi-open form of ballot should emphasise both candidate-party and candidate-voter 
interaction, where personal and party representation are compatible and thus the 
incentives of political actors can be explained by the appeal to both (Colomer 2011, 15). 
Karvonen (2011, 120–21) classifies Estonia as a “flexible” variety of preferential vote, 
where preferential voting is relevant in determining the electoral outcome in district lists, 
whereas the parties exert control over the electoral success (getting elected) of candidates 
in party lists. Thus, the analysis of the factors determining electoral success from open 
lists as well as the underlying factors influencing the composition of closed lists should 
indicate what affects the success of candidates. Furthermore, it allows to shed a light on 
what features have been favoured by political actors when it comes to explaining the 
composition of Riigikogu – and more specifically, whether the lack of female candidates 
in the parliament can be attributed to gender bias by the electorate or whether it is the 
party selectorate that tends to prefer male candidates.  
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2.2  Hypotheses 
 
This thesis and the following analysis sets two goals: 1) replicating Mirjam Allik’s 
analysis also for 2015 and 2019 Estonian parliamentary elections and thus filling in on 
the pre-existing information; 2) adding additional variables and testing whether and what 
effect they have on the electoral success of candidates.  
The rational choice institutionalism approach has been used as basis for assumptions to 
formulate the hypotheses explaining the electoral success of candidates. It is presumed 
the political actors’ decisions are influenced by the institutional rules. Parties are led by 
their vote seeking objective, whilst voters are expected to vote for a candidate with the 
winning potential to not waste their votes. Whilst the unit of analysis is a single candidate 
at one election, the effects will be tested on individual-level, rather than country-level. 
To start off, in her article, Allik (2015) has focused on the effect of gender on the electoral 
success for 1992-2011 Estonian parliamentary elections. More specifically, she looks at 
whether gender has an effect on votes and draws conclusions about the effect of ballot 
types, associating the probability of getting elected from open or closed lists with voter 
and party bias, respectively. Whilst the literature on the effect of institutional factors and 
namely of ballot types on the electoral outcome has remained somewhat contested, the 
positive effect of closed lists was attributed to both voter and party behaviour, where 
parties balance the potential bias of voters by positioning female candidates in winnable 
positions. Voter bias was expected to be reflected in lower votes and election probability 
of female candidates, which would prove that open lists are less beneficial for ensuring 
female candidates’ success of becoming representatives. At the same time, party bias was 
expected to be best reflected in party-list composing  strategies rather than in the share of 
female candidates who have received compensatory mandates, as in the case of Estonia, 
the distribution of these mandates depend on parties’ success in districts (Allik 2015, 
435).  
Following Allik’s analysis with the compatible methods employed and data used for 2015 
and 2019 elections, general hypotheses can be presented to frame the objectives of this 
study. When observing the composition of representatives in Riigikogu and the visible 
difference in the share of men and women in the parliament, a bias could be presumed 
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affecting the electoral success of female candidates. Thus, the effect of being female on 
the electoral success is tested. Whilst the success can be defined both in terms of the 
individual votes candidates manage to gain as well as the seats they receive through the 
allocation of personal or district mandate, the electoral outcome based on gender is 
evaluated for both indicators of success. Thus, it is tested whether 
H1: female candidates receive less votes than male candidates, 
and  
H2: female candidates are less likely to get elected from open lists than male 
candidates.  
At the same time, the “peculiarity” of Estonian electoral system and the use of both open 
and closed lists also calls for analysis of national lists. About a fifth of the seats are still 
allocated through compensatory mandates and the share of women receiving 
compensatory mandates has remained stable throughout elections regardless the overall 
decreasing number of seats allocated through national lists. The placement of candidates 
on national list is crucial for receiving a compensatory mandate. National lists can both 
introduce new candidates to parliament who have little chance of receiving personal or 
district mandate, or it can also secure the chances of getting elected for candidates with 
relatively good chances of getting elected from open lists. Hence, the higher the position 
of the candidate, the better chances of getting elected the candidate has. The effect of 
gender is tested on the placement of candidates on national lists. Given there is little 
electoral risk in placing women higher on the lists, it is tested whether overall: 
H3: female candidates are favoured in placing them higher on national lists than male 
candidates. 
However, since the national lists are up to intra-party decisions, it is presumed that there 
are differences between parties and their list-composing strategies and thus the effect of 
gender is tested separately for each of the parties in each election.  
At the same time, as the extensive literature on the effects of candidate success suggests, 
gender alone is not viable in explaining the potential differences between male and female 
candidates. Thus, other variables influencing voters’ decisions, namely candidate’s 
position in district and party lists, incumbency, age, and the vote share of the party are 
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controlled to test the effect of gender on votes as proposed by Allik in her analytical 
framework (2015). Furthermore, additional variables accounting for the cumulative 
legislative experience, party membership experience, and education are added and 
controlled.  
Both parties and voters are presumed to prefer experienced candidates. For parties, the 
incentive to favour incumbent candidates is their background: these candidates have 
proven to be successful in collecting votes and therefore can be seen beneficial in 
increasing the party’s vote share. Also, experienced candidates may attract enough votes 
to earn a party multiple seats in a district. This is beneficial both for parties hoping to 
maximise their seat gains as well as other, perhaps weaker candidates who would not 
have stood a chance in getting elected without the gained mandates of a strong candidate. 
At the same time, voters are expected to vote for candidates that have electoral experience 
as they can assign a value to their work and thus minimise the risks of voting for 
unfavourable candidate due to lack of information.  
The incumbency-effect could also be looked into more specifically. In Allik’s work 
(2015) incumbent is a member of parliament, European parliament, or a minister at the 
time of elections. As the candidate is in the public’s eye at the time of elections and thus 
might be more visible for the voters, and in turn, also more attractive for parties, 
incumbency can be seen as an important factor for determining a candidate’s success. At 
the same time, one could also assume that the political experience, and especially 
legislative experience is associated with candidate’s higher vote share and probability of 
getting elected. The more time candidate has spent as a member of parliament, the more 
experience and visibility has been gained, which could make the candidate more 
“appealing” both for voters and parties.  
Several aspects can be tested when the effect of political experience is examined. Theory 
suggests voters can prefer male candidates when choosing from among non-incumbent 
candidates. Political actors tend to favour non-incumbents who resemble the pool of 
incumbents, which further means harvesting as well as recreating the understanding of 
the profile of typical representatives (Fox & Lawless 2005, 646; Norris 2004, 182, 184). 
Since most of the incumbents are male, the parties as well as voters may prefer male 
candidates. Thus, the effect of the “lack of political experience” is tested – it is analysed, 
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whether there are differences in success chances for male and female candidates who have 
no legislative experience and run for the elections first time. Once first-time candidates 
stand little chance of getting elected in the first place, the difference is tested for vote 
share: 
H1.1: female first-time candidates are associated with lower vote share as compared to 
male first-time candidates. 
One could also test the effect of candidate’s party membership experience. Party could 
be more motivated to favour the candidates who have been party members longer. The 
effect of party membership could be especially notable for the closed lists, which are 
directly composed by parties. It can be assumed a party would favour their members more 
than non-members in party lists. If in some cases the inclusion of non-affiliated candidates 
were led by the wish to include well-known people in party lists (e.g. politicians who 
have had previous political or party experience, but have “changed the sides” or publicly 
known people, such as actors, singers etc), they would gain more directly from their 
inclusion in open lists, whereas for closed lists where the voter has minimal chances of 
affecting the election of a candidate, parties would favour candidate’s membership status. 
Although elected non-affiliated members still can belong to a party faction in Riigikogu 
just like party members, it is expected that party membership could explain the success 
of a candidate both in terms of appealing for voters who are more inclined to vote for a 
party and might prefer a candidate affiliated with the party. At the same time, membership 
could explain the placement of candidates in national lists when parties value membership 
loyalty.  
Continuing on other candidate-level factors, candidate’s age is controlled for. At the same 
time, also candidate’s placement on national and district lists are controlled – expectedly, 
better positions on both lists could be presumed to increase the visibility and gains for top 
candidates. Although the placement of candidates should not matter for preferential 
voting for open lists, the better position of candidates could harvest votes from voters 
voting for party (unsure of their preferences towards certain candidates). Even though 
national lists are not presented at the time of casting a vote either in polling stations or 
other mediums of voting, the lists are publicly available and it is presumed the favoured 
candidates are positioned at the top of both lists. Furthermore, the popularity of the party 
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is controlled. The allocation of seats is determined by the collective votes gained by party 
list in a given district. Hence, the electoral chances of candidates are affected by the 
popularity of party list within a district and should be accounted when assessing the 
factors accounting for electoral success of individual candidates.  
Allik has also included district magnitude as an explanatory variable for testing the 
electoral probability of female candidates in smaller and larger districts. Based on a 
presumption that larger districts favour women in terms of decreased competition, it can 
be tested whether: 
H2.1: female candidates have a higher chance of getting elected in larger districts than 
in smaller districts, 
and 
H1.2: larger districts are positively associated with female candidates’ vote share.  
 
2.3  Operationalisation of variables 
 
The electoral success of candidates is indicated and tested using two dependent variables: 
the vote share of a candidate and getting elected. Furthermore, the placement of 
candidates in national list is tested with the third dependent variable, which refers to 
candidate’s rank on party list. Quantitative methods are found suitable and applied for 
analysing these dependent variables, as given methods are widely used in academic 
studies for studying similar phenomena. Furthermore, statistical methods are called for 
due to the “volume” of cases (i.e. the number of candidates) as well as to secure 
comparability when replicating the models proposed by Mirjam Allik. Based on the 
“characteristics” of dependent variable, either multiple regression analysis or logarithmic 
regression analysis are used. Statistical analysis is conducted using the program R.  Large-
N design is applied, with a single candidate a unit of analysis.  
When measuring the success with the regards to candidate’s vote gain, the variable of 
vote share of a candidate is modified, following Allik’s analysis (2015, 436). The 
dependent variable for regression model estimating the effect of gender on votes is the 
logit transformation of candidate’s votes:  
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𝑦𝑐 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑣𝑐
𝑉𝑑
⁄
1−
𝑣𝑐
𝑉𝑑
⁄
) , 
where Yc – logit transformation of candidate c vote chare, 
vc - the number of votes a candidate c received, 
Vd  - the number of votes cast in district d.  
The logit transformation of vote share is used as it is deemed useful for treating variables 
which are highly skewed, allowing to present the relationships between different variables 
“in proportional terms” (Hardy 1993, 56). As the dependent variable is hereby a 
continuous variable of vote share, the appropriate method for analysing the vote share is 
multiple regression analysis, which allows to test the effects of candidate-, party-, and 
state-level factors on candidate’s vote share.   
For testing whether open lists are less beneficial in terms of getting elected for female 
candidates as compared to male candidates, a dependent variable of “getting elected” is 
used. This is a binary variable for which the value “1” indicates that candidate received 
either personal or district mandate (i.e. the candidate was elected from open list), and the 
value “0” indicates that candidate was not elected or was elected through closed list. With 
a binary dependent variable, logistic regression analysis is suitable for testing the 
probability of getting elected. 
Since Estonian electoral system introduces two lists which “behave” inherently 
differently – the success of the candidates for open lists are determined by the preferences 
of the voters whereas for national list, the ranking of the candidate first and foremost 
determines the chances of getting elected from party lists. Thus, for testing which factors 
contribute to the composition of party list, the effect of candidate-level factors have been 
tested to explain the ranking of candidate in a national list, the latter as a dependent 
variable. Ranking, again, is a continuous variable, allowing to apply multiple regression 
analysis method for testing the effects of variables.  
The information about dependent variables and most of the independent variables (e.g. 
age, education, district magnitude, position in district and national lists, party’s vote share 
in district) have been retrieved from the data provided by the Electoral Committee.  
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Allik has included several control variables in her analysis for testing the effect of gender 
on candidates’ electoral success (2015). To start off, a variable reflecting the recent 
political experience of the candidate – incumbency – is a binary variable, which indicates 
whether candidate was either a member of parliament, member of European Parliament 
or a minister at the time of elections. The value “1” refers to candidate who held either of 
the abovementioned positions at the time of elections, and “0” refers to candidate who 
held neither of these positions. Data for this variable has been retrieved from official 
webpages of Riigikogu, European Parliament, and Republic of Estonia Government.  
The variable of age refers to the age of the candidate at the time of elections. The ranking 
of candidates both in district and national lists refers to the numerical position of the 
candidate in both lists for given election. Party votes indicates the “popularity” of the 
party in a district – that is, the collective number of votes candidates in a party list received 
in a district. For simplifying the interpretation of this variable, party votes have been 
converted (i.e. the votes are divided by 1000) – the variable would thus indicate the 
association for a change in 1000 votes received by the party. Information about all these 
variables are retrieved from Electoral Committee. 
In addition to variables proposed by Mirjam Allik, the general availability of data for 
Estonian candidates allowed to add other variables for testing the factors affecting 
electoral outcome.  Whilst incumbency refers only to recent political experience, the 
cumulative legislative experience was added. Legislative experience variable refers to the 
time candidate has spent as a member of parliament. It can be presumed the experience 
in holding position on national level would be considered important in affecting the 
chances of candidate. When in the prior studies, previous political experience has rather 
been approached in binary terms (e.g. Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki & Crisp 2010) or has 
scarcely been used for explaining the positions of candidates on lists (e.g. Chiru & 
Popescu 2017), this work aims to add the variable of “cumulative parliamentary 
experience” for analysing its effect on the three dependent variables. The time candidate 
has been parliament member has been summarized for all the terms from 7th to 13th 
Riigikogu up until the day of elections studied. The term of Riigikogu was counted from 
the date the election results were certified until the date before the results of next elections 
were certified, except for 13th Riigikogu term, for which case the day of elections was 
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counted as the final day of term1. Parliamentary experience is a continuous variable, 
where the values present the time the candidate has spent as a member of Riigikogu in 
years2. Information about the time spent as a member of Riigikogu and any chances in 
the composition of Riigikogu during the terms was retrieved from several sources due to 
occasional discrepancies between sources found during the data collection process. This, 
however, allowed to compare the information between different sources and ensure the 
credibility of the data. Information about membership status was retrieved from official 
web page of Riigikogu or official statistical documents-overviews composed by experts. 
Legal documents stating decisions regarding becoming, stopping, or declining 
membership during the term were turned to when it was necessary to control the accuracy 
of information retrieved from aforementioned choices due to observed differences. 
Candidacy experience refers to the number of times a candidate has run for parliamentary 
elections (regardless their party affiliation). Whilst the focus is on the candidates who 
have no previous experience in running for elections and therefore also no legislative 
experience, a binary variable is used, where value “1” refers to newcomer (first-time) 
candidates, and value “0” refers to candidates who have had previous candidacy or 
legislative experience.  To determine the candidacy experience of a candidate, the number 
of times candidate had run for the elections prior the elections being analysed was 
counted. Experience was counted for each time a candidate had run for elections from 
1992 elections by looking through the electoral lists. The lists are accessible via Estonian 
Electoral Committee web page. Although the effect of candidacy experience was 
originally planned to be tested, it deemed hard to differentiate the effect of running as a 
candidate from the effect of being a parliamentary member – the first would explain the 
latter. Thus, it was rather zoned in to whether being a newcomer in parliamentary 
elections could explain the poor electoral success, and furthermore, whether the effect of 
being female would differ for first-time candidates.3 
                                                          
1 Alternatively, a period between the first and last sitting could have been counted as a term of Riigikogu. 
However, most documents the information was retrieved from accounted the membership already before 
the first sitting and thus the term was specified based on result-certification dates. Given the variable 
indicates experience in years and the time period between certification of results and first and last sitting is 
relatively short, there is no substantive difference in which indicator is chosen.  
2 If a candidate was nominated for a seat in Riigikogu and he or she declined the seat the same day, their 
experience have not been accounted.  
3 There were cases for both elections where the candidate fell into both the categories of incumbent as well 
as newcomer. This occurred when a candidate was placed on political position or had had prior candidacy 
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Party membership experience is a continuous variable referring to the time the candidate 
has been a member of a party in whose list the candidate ran for elections. If the candidate 
has been a member of several parties or has registered as a member of the same party 
several times, the latest registration prior to elections has been taken account. Any 
candidate who has joined the party after the final day of presenting party lists to national 
electoral committee (45 days prior the elections) but before the election day has not been 
marked as a member of a party.4 Membership experience was calculated from the day of 
joining the party until election day. It is expected that since parties also gain from the 
membership status of their candidates – for example, financially by collecting 
membership fees (Scarrow 1994, 42) –, the parties would be more inclined to “give back” 
to their members, especially when it comes to list placement. Voters casting their 
preferential votes based on their party preferences might prefer candidates affiliated with 
parties. 5 Data for measuring party experience as well as determining the gender of the 
candidate was retrieved from e-Business Register.  
Overall, all the data for operationalizing variables is retrieved from official and credible 
sources. Hence, the data used has been considered trustworthy. Furthermore, as the 
overview of the operationalization of variables indicates, the variables themselves are 
straightforward and thus problems in terms of validity are not foreseen. Biases with 
regards to data and its translation to variables can occur due to errors that could have been 
made when entering the data, however, upon checking the data prior the analysis any 
logically invalid values resulting from incorrect entry of data were corrected.  
The created “database” consisted of 861 and 1084 observations for 2015 and 2019 
elections, respectively. Independent candidates were removed from among the cases 
studied as the “groups” of independent candidates was not numerous, their vote share was 
                                                          
experience, but not on parliamentary elections (e.g. for Maris Lauri and Anne Sulling for 2015, and Janek 
Mäggi, Indrek Tarand and Riina Sikkut for 2019 elections). These candidates were marked as incumbents 
only (i.e. they were not treated as newcomers).  
4 If the candidate has left and joined the same party again within a period of one month, the period of leave 
has not been counted, i.e. it was marked that the membership continued throughout this period of leave. 
5 Alternatively, a binary variable of affiliation was also incorporated for preliminary testing and comparing, 
whether this modification would better the overall explanatory power of the models. The candidates who 
were the members of parties the lists they were candidate were affiliated (marked as “1”), whereas the 
candidates who had not joined a party but ran for elections in party lists were counted as unaffiliated 
(marked as “0”). However, this modification was not included to the actual analysis as it did not better the 
models for vote- and seat-gaining models.  
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marginal, and they were not directly comparable to candidates running in the lists of 
parties. Other research decisions made in terms of altering or converting variables have 
already been described above.  
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3. Analysis  
 
2019 elections saw both the highest number of elected female representatives as well as 
the highest percentage of female candidates in the almost-30-year re-independence 
period. Since the 1992 elections, women have constituted on average about 22% of the 
pool of candidates, staying between 14 to 27 percent – and the share of elected female 
representatives has stayed below 20% with an exception of 2007 elections  when peaking 
up to 23.8% (Allik 2015, 434).  Consistent with Allik’s analysis where she highlighted 
the number of female candidates as well as representatives differs across elections, 
increasing in some elections whereas decreasing for others, the lower number and 
electoral success of female candidates for 2015 parliamentary elections as compared to 
2019 elections is in line with the overall tendencies. What does stand out for 2015 
elections is the high share of female candidates (Table 1) who have received a mandate 
through closed lists for which the success rate for women has generally been notably 
lower in the previous elections, staying around 20% on average. When looking at the 
results of 2015 and 2019 elections and comparing them to Allik’s analysis for earlier 
elections, higher share of women has been consistently elected through closed lists as 
compared to open lists, with an exception of 2011 elections. Although there is little 
difference between 2015 and 2019 elections as can be seen from Table 1, it could indicate 
closed lists can benefit women – that is, only if women have been favoured by parties by 
placing them on high positions.  
Table 1. Female candidates and representatives by list type in 2015 and 2019 elections. 
 2015 2019 
Total Female   Female % Total Female Female % 
Elected 101 24 23.8 101 28 27.7 
Open 79 16 20.3 81 22 27.1 
Closed 22 8 36.4 20 6 30 
Candidates 861 231 26.8 1084 352 32.5 
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However, it can be presumed the incentives for favouring certain candidates differ across 
parties and thus the effect of gender could be different for each party. This will be zoned 
into in the third part of the analysis. The first two parts of the analysis aim to shed a light 
on the factors constituting candidate’s vote share and probability of getting elected from 
district lists where their electoral success is up to voters’ preferences. 
3.1 Success in votes: the vote share model 
 
The primary indicator of candidate’s personal success is the votes they manage to gain in 
parliamentary elections. Whilst the vote-differences of candidates are quite high, with 
most of the candidates receiving well below 1000 votes and some of the popular 
candidates collecting notably more than that, median number of votes is used to illustrate 
the differences between the sexes (see for Table 2, pp 44). This overview of descriptive 
statistics on votes also helps to portray the distribution of votes across groups, which is 
harder to visualise when interpreting the effects of variables on the modified dependent 
variable for vote share in the following regression models.  
The median for collected votes was 223 and 153 for 2015 and 2019 parliamentary 
elections, respectively. When looking at gender-based differences in Table 2 (pp 44), 
female candidates’ median votes are notably lower than male candidates’ vote median. 
However, gender alone is not enough to claim female candidates have been systematically 
disapproved by the electorate. When leaving aside other party-based or institutional 
factors, such as the overall popularity of the party, or the favouring or unfavouring effect 
of district magnitude on the competition for votes and seats, some of the most important 
predictors of candidates’ success can be argued to be their personal characteristics, 
especially when it comes to forms of political experience. Whilst Allik has noted a 
consistent and statistically significant effect of incumbency on the success of candidates 
throughout the previous elections both in terms of vote share and probability of getting 
elected (2015), it is reasonable to continue zoning into the effect of gender on different 
“subgroups” of candidates when explaining the vote-differences. As can be seen from 
Table 2, taking account the effect of holding a political national level position at the time 
of elections, the differences indeed diminish or are even reversed. While in 2015 female 
incumbents’ median vote was higher than male incumbent’s median vote, there was little 
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difference between male and female candidate’s median vote in 2019. Female non-
incumbents’ votes were similar to male non-incumbents’ in 2015, although male non-
incumbents’ median vote was higher for 2019. When looking at the differences between 
first-time candidates, female newcomers do slightly better than male newcomers in 2015, 
although worse in 2019.  
Notable difference between men’s and women’s vote shares occur when only gender is 
accounted. However, as Table 2 (pp 44) implies, some of the differences in vote shares 
of men and women should rather be attributed to candidates who have some level of 
previous legislative or electoral (i.e. candidacy) experience and it can be presumed the 
level of this experience (i.e. how many times has the candidate run for elections before or 
what is their previous political “status”) is what accounts for the differences in the votes 
across genders. This tendency has both been observed by Allik for Estonian elections, as 
well as candidate-level analyses in other countries with similar electoral systems (e.g. 
Prihatini 2019). The effect of gender on subgroups is observed in more detail later in the 
analysis. It should also be noted that whilst there is little effect of gender on votes when 
the experience level of the candidates is equal, the women’s collective vote-share 
differences compared to men can also be explained by the fact that female incumbents 
account for only about a fourth from the total pool of incumbent candidates for both 2015 
and 2019 parliamentary elections. At the same time, whilst the pool of first-time 
candidates was also dominated by male candidates, female newcomers can mostly be 
found from the lists of smaller parties with little chances of getting elected – or new 
parties, whose electoral chances are equally minimal. For example, 2019 parliamentary 
elections saw the entrance of two new parties (Estonia 200 and Richness of Life) as well 
as two small and renewed parties with previous parliamentary experience but little chance 
of succeeding (Estonian Greens and Estonian Free Party) in the competition for seats. The 
lists of these parties composed high share of female candidates, most of whom had no or 
very little national political experience both on legislative and electoral level (i.e. 
experience in running for elections before), but the poor or moderate popularity of these 
parties might partly explain the notably lower overall median vote for female first-time 
candidates for 2019 elections. Still, although relevant for explaining the differences 
between vote shares of the candidates, non-incumbent and first-time candidates are most 
likely the weakest as they have had little publicity, experience and weaker network, which 
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can be detrimental to their success potential – hence this bias is unlikely to be reflected 
on the actual chances of getting elected (Allik 2015, 438).  
Table 2. Median votes by gender and incumbency for 2015 and 2019 elections. 
 2015 2019 
Female 207 130 
Male 232.5 175.5 
Female incumbents 1698 1524 
Male incumbents  1356.5 1573 
Female non-
incumbents 
168 106.5 
Male non-incumbents 180 141 
Female newcomers 133 81 
Male newcomers 127 94 
 
When moving on to analysing the effect of gender on vote share, regression analysis was 
used to test the effect of factors contributing to the vote-success of the candidates. The 
predicted vote share for female candidates is lower than predicted votes share of male 
candidates in both 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections as can be seen from Table 3 
(pp 45), although vote share difference is statistically significant only for 2019 elections 
(p < 0.05), which confirms there is a difference in vote gaining success between male and 
female candidates.  
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Table 3. The effect of being female on candidate’s vote share for 2015 and 2019 
parliamentary elections.   
DV: logit transformation of 
candidate’s vote share 
2015 
 
2019 
 
Coef. 
Intercept -5.320*** -5.683*** 
Female -0.107 -0.228* 
Observations 861 1084 
R-squared 0.000 0.004 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000 0.003 
F Statistic 0.849 (df=1; 859) 4.591 (df=1; 1082) 
Note *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
However, as mentioned above, there are multiple factors that contribute to the success of 
a candidate. Candidate’s electoral success is affected by institutional, party as well as 
candidate’s personal characteristics, which in turn can be mutually reinforcing. Whilst 
voters can favour candidates who have political experience and whose performance they 
can validate through voting, the same virtues might appeal to parties, who have to make 
strategic decisions in line with institutional limitations and perceived potential for 
electoral penalties they could face when failing to meet electorate’s expectations. 
Experienced candidates have better position in terms of exposure to publicity, financial 
means, and networks, which can simultaneously encourage taking up candidacy as well 
as enhance the potential for success. Candidates’ personal success can also be influenced 
by the popularity of the party – especially when it comes to getting elected – or district 
magnitude, which regulates the designated possibilities for gaining seats. Hence, the 
effect of gender on vote share is tested when candidate, party, and institutional level 
factors widely regarded as important predictors of electoral success are controlled. 
Following Mirjam Allik’s analysis on 1992-2011 parliamentary elections, the effect of 
gender is tested also for 2015 and 2019 elections when candidate’s age, party popularity, 
position on electoral lists, and recent political experience are controlled for model 1. This 
model is specified in Allik’s analysis and is employed to allow comparisons of the effects 
with previous elections. Furthermore, the effect of gender is also tested with additional 
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variables added to the model. Model 2 introduces a variable for cumulative political 
experience, which summarises the time candidate has spent as a member of Riigikogu, 
variable indicating the potential effect of party membership, and variable testing the effect 
of education on vote share. The results of regression models 1 and 2 are presented in 
Table 4. These models are also further specified using interaction terms when it was 
presumed – based on theory, observations from testing the effects when running different 
models, or wish to compare the results for different indicators of success – that effect of 
female could differ across subgroups.  
Table 4. Explaining candidate’s vote share for 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections 
(models 1 and 2).  
DV: logit 
transformation of 
candidate’s vote share 2015 
model 1 
           2015 
model 2 
2019 
model 1 
 
2019 
model 2 
 
Coef. 
Intercept -6.576*** -6.509*** -5.945*** -6.144*** 
Female -0.143 -0.140 -0.173* -0.173* 
District list position -0.215*** -0.213*** -0.231*** -0.227*** 
National list position 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002 0.002* 
Incumbency 1.200*** 0.807*** 1.195*** 0.930*** 
Age 0.051* 0.036 0.028 0.024 
Age2 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
Party votes in district 0.091*** 0.078*** 0.116*** 0.105*** 
Legislative experience 
(years) 
 0.047**  0.004 
Party membership 
experience (years) 
 0.015*  0.028*** 
Higher education  0.586***  0.453*** 
Observations 861 861 1084 1084 
R-squared 0.398 0.435 0.522 0.550 
Adjusted R-squared 0.393 0.428 0.519 0.546 
F Statistic 
80.68 (df=7; 853) 
65.51(df=10; 850) 
168 (df=7; 1076) 
131.4 (df=10; 
1073) 
Note  *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001  
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As the dependent variable for both vote share models is a logit transformation of vote 
share, the model and associations can primarily be interpreted through looking at the 
direction of the association. When accounting other factors in addition to gender, the 
results in Table 4 indicated a lower vote share for female candidates as compared to male 
candidates, other variables being controlled. The effect of being female on votes was 
significant only for 2019 elections. This could partly be attributed both to the pool of new 
candidates, from among whom women did worse, but also to popularity of Conservative 
Party, for which men did especially good.  
As expected, recent political experience (incumbency) is a significant predictor of 
candidates’ vote success for both models and years. Holding a position as a member of 
Riigikogu, as a minister in a government, or as a member of European Parliament at the 
time of elections is positively associated with vote share. These candidates are exposed 
to more publicity due to their positions, which can simultaneously bring voters’ attention 
to them and express their recent experience in office, which is appealing both for the 
voters and the parties. 
Continuing on political experience, incumbency is first and foremost operationalised as 
an indicator of candidate’s recent experience in the political position. At the same time, 
the length of the political experience is also expected to affect candidate’s chances for 
success – the longer time spent as a member of Riigikogu indicates candidate’s seniority, 
which is expected to be attractive for voters and parties in their preferences. Similar to 
incumbency, legislative experience is also positively associated with vote share, but it is 
significant only for 2015 elections. Non-significant association for 2019 elections 
indicates marginal effect of cumulative experience on vote success. When 2015 elections 
still saw relatively stable pool of candidates mostly composed of the members of already 
“established” parties, many of whom also had some political experience, 2019 elections 
witnessed the success of candidates from formerly less popular (Conservative Party) or 
to some extent even new parties (primarily Estonia 200). Although recent political 
experience was still significant predictor of vote share even in changed political climate 
for 2019 elections, electorate’s shift of support towards alternative candidates might 
explain for the smaller effect of overall legislative experience. Thus, cumulative political 
experience might predict candidates’ success well when the political climate is stable and 
party system less fragmented, but it’s effect can be more open to fluctuations as new and 
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relatively successful actors enter political arena. Furthermore, incumbency remains a 
stronger predictor of vote share success as it accounts for the visibility at the time of 
elections. One can presume that when it comes to cumulative legislative experience, not 
all experience is seen equal among electorate -  for example, as it also combines the 
experience of alternate members, whose length of term and expected publicity and name 
recognition could have been smaller, the temporary replacement in between the terms 
might not have caught voters’ eyes.  It also does not account for the time spent holding 
other high political positions (e.g. being a minister), which could have potential in 
affecting the success chances of a candidate on its own.  
Furthermore, when looking at Table 2 (pp 44), there is also difference in median votes 
for male and female candidates who are first-time voters in 2019 elections. Thus, it makes 
sense to test the experience in terms of candidacy experience. Female non-incumbents 
tend to receive less votes than male non-incumbent candidates, but the results vary across 
elections, as also highlighted by Allik (2015). Non-incumbent category still composes 
candidates who were not incumbents at the time of elections, but who might have had 
legislative experience or exposure through previous candidacy experience in addition to 
first-time candidates without national-level political experience. By separating candidates 
based on their electoral experience (or more precisely – the lack of it), it is aimed to test 
whether gender has effect for being first-time candidates. However, the inclusion of 
interaction term to the model yielded no significant association for either of the elections 
(Table 5, model 2.1, pp 50), indicating being female and first-time candidate does not 
undermine the chances of success for candidate. When accounting the influence of gender 
to the newcomers’ group, the differences between male and female newcomers differ only 
marginally. Rather, the votes gaps between political newcomers and candidates holding 
political position is what could be presumed to account for the overall difference of 
electoral vote-success between genders. Thus, when deciding to vote for an “unknown” 
candidate, voters do not supress female newcomer candidates’ chances. Although 
literature refers parties and voters might prefer male candidates more in similar 
circumstances as they resemble the usual pool of representatives (Fox ja Lawless 2005, 
649), 2015 and 2019 elections did not show evidence of these preferences. 
Continuing on experience, party membership experience is positively associated with 
vote share. The effect is significant for both 2015 and 2019 elections at least on p < 0.05 
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significance level. The difference in the effect of party membership length variable could 
be attributed to the levels of success of new and “renewed” parties for each election. 
Whilst 2015 parliamentary elections introduced two new parties to the parliament when 
Conservative and Free Party surpassed the threshold, 2019 elections did not see the 
success of new parties established prior the elections (Estonia 200 and Richness of Life) 
as well as the “renewed” Free Party and other smaller parties (e.g. Greens). The more 
time candidate has been a member of party, the more time they have likely had to establish 
their role among party selectorate and voters, resulting in higher vote share. At the same 
time, the effect could be mutually reinforcing. Presumably the intra-party competition for 
a place for candidacy is bigger for the established parties, which also might support the 
inclusion of more party-loyal members and especially those with political experience. 
This is further illustrated by the fact that the lists of smaller and new parties can be 
characterised by larger share of unaffiliated candidates as compared to their “established” 
competitors, who generally do not seem to include unaffiliated candidates in election lists. 
At the same time, once the effect of party membership status on votes was alternatively 
tested with a binary variable indicating affiliation with party (where the value “1” 
indicated a candidate was officially a member of a party), affiliation in itself remained 
statistically non-significant for both elections indicating membership status alone has no 
effect.  
Having higher education is also positively associated and significant for both elections. 
Since the model, based on how it is specified, assumes the effect is same across all 
subgroups, interaction with gender variable was used see if there were any differences in 
the effect of education between groups. Whilst other interaction combinations of variables 
in the model with gender yielded no statistically significant results, it was significant for 
gender-education interaction term for 2019 elections, indicating an effect of being female 
differs across education levels (Table 5, model 2.2, pp 50). The coefficient of “female” 
indicates the effect of being female when the candidate does not have higher education 
(education is “0”). This is negatively associated with vote share for both elections, 
although significant still only for 2019 elections. However, the coefficient for female 
candidates with higher education is close to zero. Thus, being woman has no effect when 
candidates have higher education. At the same time, the effect of being female had 
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negative association when candidates did not have higher education – female candidates 
with lower education received less votes.  
Table 5.  Explaining vote share for 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections (model 2.1 and 
model 2.2).  
DV: logit transformation 
of candidate’s vote share 
2015 
(model 2.1) 
2015 
(model 2.2) 
2019 
(model 2.1) 
2019 
(model 2.2) 
Coef. 
Intercept -6.035*** -6.483*** -5.878*** -6.055*** 
Female -0.015 -0.224 -0.016 -0.486** 
District list position -0.209*** -0.213*** -0.225*** -0.226*** 
National list position 0.007*** 0.006 0.002* -0.002 
Incumbency 0.727*** 0.804*** 0.879*** 0.934*** 
Age 0.028 0.035* 0.022 0.023 
Age2 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
Party votes in district 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 
Legislative experience 
(years) 
0.040* 
0.047** 
0.001 
0.005 
Party membership 
experience (years) 
0.006 
0.015* 
0.021*** 
0.028*** 
Higher education 0.546*** 0.561*** 0.435*** 0.341*** 
Higher education*female  0.104  0.403* 
Newcomer -0.350***  -0.260**  
Newcomer*female 
-0.134 
 -0.192 
 
 
Observations 861 861 1084 1084 
R-squared 0.446 0.435 0.557 0.552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.438 0.428 0.552 0.548 
F Statistic 56.92 (df=12; 
848) 
59.52 (df=11; 
849) 
112.2 (df=12; 
1071) 
120.4 (df=11; 
1072) 
Note *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
When it comes to other variables, candidate’s position in district list is an important 
indicator of vote-success. Lower position in district list can be associated with lower vote 
share and the variable is significant contributor to the model for both elections. Whilst it 
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was expected that preferred candidates were placed higher on both national and district 
lists, the results indicate some discrepancies – lower positions in national lists are 
positively associated with vote share, other variables held constant. However, since voters 
are presented district lists when casting their vote and hence national placement is 
unlikely to directly affect the voting decision, the effect of national list should rather be 
interpreted as a potential indicator that candidates are positioned differently in two types 
of lists. This will be further looked into in the third part of the analysis. Another 
significant factor for both elections is party’s vote share in district. The vote in preferential 
voting is pooled which contributes to also deciding party’s success (Karvonen 2011, 120) 
and thus the positive association of popularity of the party with candidates vote share was 
expected. When it comes to the effect of age on vote share, the negative value for the 
variable of age in the power of two apparent for both elections indicates reversed U-shape 
association with vote share – increase in age is associated with increase in votes until 
certain age, but the vote share starts to drop later. The effect of age is easier to illustrate 
on figure. Since age was significant only for 2015 elections, the effect of this variable is 
presented for this election. Figure 2 illustrates the vote share starts to decrease at around 
the age of 45.  
 
Figure 2. Predicted vote share by candidates’ age for 2015 election.  
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When comparing the effect of being woman on vote share with Allik’s analysis for 
previous elections, association with gender was generally significant and negative for 
prior elections. However, the coefficient differed across elections, which allows to 
presume there is no systematic gender gap for female candidates, but rather the results 
are dependent overall on the political climate, including the popularity of certain parties, 
and the pool of female (incumbent) candidates. Thus, it is not surprising that the effect of 
gender was negative but significant only for 2019 elections. Similarly, Allik has reported 
the significant and positive association of incumbency with vote share throughout all 
previous elections. This tendency continued for the latest parliamentary elections, as seen 
from Table 4, and can even be observed for other indicators of experience, such as in 
terms of cumulative legislative and party membership experience that were added. The 
effect of age, party popularity and ranking on district lists yielded similar results for all 
of the elections, however the coefficient for age has been larger and significant for 
previous elections, whereas the effect remained quite subtle for the latest elections. This 
could be an indication that either the pool of incumbents or candidates has become 
“younger” or the perceptions of the qualities of potential representatives have changed 
and younger candidates have not been undermined. However, these conclusions can not 
be made based on looking at the differences alone.  
Whilst important notices have been mapped for explaining the differences between 
gender vote share and “framing” the understanding of gender vote gap and perception of 
inequality, these biases do not necessarily help to explain the differences in numbers of 
male and female representatives – as also shown by Allik (2015) for earlier elections, the 
biases tend to be on the level of candidates who have little chance of getting elected in 
the first place. Whilst vote share as a dependent variable is more sensitive to fluctuations 
and might “overestimate” the perception of candidate’s success in terms of how it reflects 
in the pool of representatives, the effect of the same variables are tested on the probability 
of getting elected, which should shed more light on the potential biases on the level of 
representatives.  
3.2 Getting elected: the seat-gaining model 
 
For testing whether gender has an effect on electoral outcomes when it comes to getting 
elected, logistic regression models were ran with the same variables. Dependent variable 
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here is electoral success in the form of “getting elected”, where the value “1” stands for 
receiving personal or district mandate. Allik (2015) also added district magnitude and the 
interaction of district magnitude and gender to the model to test whether election 
probability differs for women in larger and smaller districts. Model 3 represents a model 
specified by Mirjam Allik, whereas new variables of experiences and education have been 
added to model 4. Similar to vote share models, the effects of different variables are tested 
for 2015 and 2019 elections separately. The results are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6. Getting elected from open list for 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections 
(model 3 and model 4). 
Outcome: getting elected from open list (0 = not elected; 1=elected) 
 2015 2019 
 model 3 model 4 model 3 model 4 
 Coef. Odds 
ratio 
 
Coef. Odds 
ratio 
Coef. Odds 
ratio 
 
Coef. Odds 
ratio 
Intercept 0.664  1.043  0.658  0.700  
Female 1.357 3.885 1.330 4.011 -0.500 0.606 -0.464 0.629 
Female*District 
magnitude 
-0.248 0.780 -0.257 0.774 0.056 1.059 0.050 1.051 
District 
magnitude 
-0.033 0.967 -0.044 0.956 -0.098 0.906 -0.095 0.908 
District list 
position 
-0.987*** 0.373 -0.967*** 0.374 -0.958*** 0.384 -0.960*** 0.383 
National list 
position 
0.005 1.006 0.004 1.005 0.001 1.002 0.001 1.002 
Incumbency 1.466*** 4.335 1.634*** 5.056 1.208*** 3.349 0.989* 2.689 
Age -0.064 0.937 -0.086 0.934 -0.054 0.947 -0.070 0.932 
Age2 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.001 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Party votes in 
district 
0.218*** 1.244 0.222*** 1.248 0.273*** 1.314 0.270*** 1.311 
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Legislative 
experience 
(years) 
  0.023 1.028   0.014 1.014 
Party 
membership 
experience 
(years) 
  -0.040 0.962   0.010 1.010 
Higher 
education 
  0.490 1.633   0.509 1.664 
Number of 
observations 
861   861  1084   1084  
R-squared (Cox 
Snell) 
0.265   0.268  0.248   0.249  
R-squared 
(Nagelkerke) 
0.579   0.584  0.603   0.605  
Note *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
With an interaction effect in the models, the interpretation of coefficients are slightly 
different. As can be seen from Table 6, the coefficient for the gender variable indicates 
statistically non-significant effect of gender on the chances of getting elected in both 2015 
and 2019 parliamentary elections. This is not surprising, given the effect of gender on the 
probability of getting elected was previously noted only for 2003 elections (Allik 2015, 
440). Furthermore, the association for the interaction variable for gender and district 
magnitude is non-significant. Higher district magnitude does not increase the chances of 
getting elected for female candidates, although women have slightly higher probability 
of success in larger districts. Overall, female candidates do not do better than men in 
larger districts compared to smaller districts when it comes to getting elected. As seat-
gaining success is not too open to fluctuations, the effect of district magnitude on female 
candidates’ electoral success was additionally tested on candidates’ vote share (model 
2.3, Appendix 1, pp 76) to see whether the effect would be apparent for votes. The 
interaction with gender again yielded non-significant results, indicating the differences 
are marginal. Whilst the coefficient indicates women might do slightly better in bigger 
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districts, there is no real overall effect that could be noted on the outcome. Larger districts 
thus do not have a positive mediating effect on female candidate’s electoral success both 
in the terms of benefiting their vote share and chances of getting elected. These results 
apply only to analysed elections, as the effect has been apparent for some previous 
elections (Allik 2015) and is dependent on the political and social developments of 
political sphere prior and during specific elections (e.g. 2003 and 2007). However, the 
positive effect of district magnitude still remains rather an exception than rule for 
Estonian elections when adding the results to Allik’s analysis.  
Similar to vote share models, the effects of incumbency, party popularity and position in 
district list are significant factors also for this model. The effect of incumbency was 
especially high for 2015 elections, when the odds of getting elected for incumbents were 
five times higher than for non-incumbents, other variables held constant. The effect was 
somewhat smaller, but still significant for 2019 elections. Although all the elected parties 
in 2019 have parliamentary experience, the results can likely be explained by the increase 
in Conservative Party’s popularity, which introduced several new members to parliament. 
Party list’s popularity in a district expectedly remains to be a significant contributor to 
explaining candidate’s chances of getting elected. Also, district list position remains to 
be a significant factor explaining the electoral success. Higher position on district list is 
associated with better chances of getting elected.  However, when looking at the lists, 
stronger candidates (i.e. candidates who also have political position or experience) are 
generally placed at the top, which might partly explain the effect. The effects of these 
variables are consistent with the analysis of previous elections provided by Allik.  
When it comes to the added variables, legislative experience, party membership 
experience, and higher education did not show significant association with getting elected 
for either of the elections. Longer parliamentary and party experience thus had no effect 
on seat-gaining prospects – recent political experience is preferred over party “loyalty” 
and overall representative-experience. Similarly, education was non-significant for both 
elections. Although female candidates with lower education did worse compared to less 
educated male candidates, and the effect of gender evened out for highly educated 
candidates in terms of vote gain, the interaction was tested also for seat-gaining model. 
As the effect remained non-significant here, no differences in groups based on the effect 
of being female were observed when it came to the probability of getting elected.  
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However, whilst the vote share and receiving personal or district mandate indicate the 
effects of different variables accounting for the success of candidates in open lists, they 
reflect the preferences of voters casting their preference votes – parties have little chance 
to alter the electoral outcome at the time of elections (although they have exerted control 
over the pool of candidates). At the same time, these results do not have to align with 
party preferences. Thus, it should also be zoned into which factors are preferred by parties 
when composing party lists. These factors, in turn, can also be used to observe the 
success-potential of candidates.  
3.3 Party lists: the national list placement model 
 
Estonian electoral rules have introduced two lists, leaving both voters and parties with the 
opportunities to shape electoral outcome. Whilst most of the candidates are elected from 
open lists, about fifth of the seats are still allocated through compensatory mandates and 
the number of women elected through closed lists has generally stayed stable with few 
exceptions (e.g. 2011 elections) as can be seen from Table 7.  
Table 7. Number of mandates allocated through compensatory mandates by gender. 
 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 
Total elected 
from closed list 
60 52 46 27 26 19 22 20 
Women elected 
from closed list 
10 9 9 8 7 2 8 6 
 
Hence, it makes sense also to analyse the composition of national lists and see whether 
the same factors are favoured when composing party lists. Since the decisions of the 
placement of candidates in national lists are up to party elite and selectorate, analysing 
the placement of candidates on national list allows to give insight of the factors relevant 
for parties themselves. These factors could also mirror the values and stances of parties, 
and furthermore, give insight to which values parties may favour already during their 
candidate selection process. Analysing factors relevant for composing lists also allows to 
assess parties’ stance towards women – positions reflect the underlying strategies and 
values of parties better than the number of women receiving a compensatory mandate, as 
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the potential number of compensatory mandates allocated to parties still depends on 
party’s popularity (Allik 2015, 435). 
 
Figure 2. The share of female candidates on national list positions.  
Figure 2 illustrates the share female candidates constitute from total candidates on 
national list positions. The share is calculated for 10-position clusters, which allows to 
analyse the placement of candidates based on their gender separately throughout the lists. 
As the most successful parties have generally gained around 30 seats, candidates placed 
on positions below that have hardly any chance to get elected through closed lists. The 
general presumption is that the higher up candidates are placed on party lists, the better 
chances for getting elected they have.  
As can be seen from Figure 2, female candidates are not distributed equally across the 
national list. Women are overrepresented in the first half of the list especially for 2019 
elections, and the highest share of women is concentrated on positions between 31-40 for 
both elections. The share of female candidates starts to drop for the second half of national 
lists – positions below 70 already see fewer female candidates. The middle of the list is 
heavily populated by female candidates for 2019 elections and the share of women starts 
to drop from the place 71 and lower. Generally, the same tendency can also be noted for 
2015 elections, where the first half of the list is populated by female candidates and a 
drop of share is noted from places below 71.  
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Although the share of female candidates in the first 30 positions has increased for 2019 
elections, where almost half or more of the top-30-positions were held by women, the 
situation for the first 10 has remained similar to that of 2015 elections. Still, 4 women 
were at the top of the party lists in 2019, as compared to 1 woman in 2015 elections – 
although only one of them was a top candidate of a party with “secured” electoral success 
(i.e. the party which has been elected to the parliament in several consecutive elections 
and thus was likely to get elected again).  
The number of female candidates peaks for positions between 31-40 for both elections. 
By considering the support for most popular parties has yielded them usually 20-30 seats 
over the last elections, the most populated positions where women are concentrated are 
those below the places with perceived potential for receiving a seat. Still, the first half of 
the list for 2019 elections is dominated by female candidates, with the share dropping 
closer the end of the list. Female candidates have been positioned higher in the first third 
of the list compared to 2015 elections, which aligns with the overall tendency of women 
being positioned on better places over the elections that Allik (2015) also noted for the 
previous elections.  
However, considering only gender when looking at the placement of candidates in party 
list is not satisfactory when trying to understand the logic of list compositions and any 
possible party preferences. Thus, it is also tested whether gender has effect on list 
placement when other variables associated with candidate’s characteristics and electoral 
potential have been taken account. Furthermore, as the value for “electable positions” is 
presumed to differ across the parties, the motives behind placement are evaluated 
separately for each party. More so, different parties are expected to have different 
incentives when it comes to supporting female candidates (e.g. parties on the ideological 
left are believed to be more supportive of women (Caul 1999, 82), smaller and newer 
parties could be argued to have more incentives to include more women due to smaller 
intra-party competition or little electoral risk), different patterns are presumed to occur 
for different parties when looking at the logic of candidate-positioning. As voters have 
hardly any say over the distribution of seats, party lists are expected to be more beneficial 
for female candidates – that is, when parties place women on higher positions. Thus, 
female candidates are expected to be placed higher, other factors controlled, as placing 
59 
 
female candidates at the front of the lists proposes little risk for electoral penalization for 
parties – vice versa, it can show them in better light.  
Using multiple regression analysis with a continuous dependent variable of “national list 
positions”, the effect of gender is tested when the variables of incumbency, cumulative 
legislative experience, age, education, and party experience are controlled. Whilst the aim 
is to analyse factors affecting the list placement from candidate-specific terms, individual 
candidate-level variables were included to models. 
Table 8. The effect of gender on list positions for national lists for 2015 and 2019 elections 
(parties combined, model 3).  
DV: national list position 
2015 2019 
Coef.  
Intercept 92.521*** 108.370*** 
Female -4.007 -4.884* 
Incumbency -14.957** -32.312*** 
Age -1.585* -1.704** 
Age2 0.017* 0.018*** 
Legislative experience (years) -1.455** -0.553 
Party membership experience 
(years) 
0.193 0.165 
Higher education 2.560 -7.314** 
Observations 861 1084 
R-squared 0.056 0.110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.048 0.104 
F Statistic 7.187 (df=7; 853) 19.03 (df=7; 1076) 
Note *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
The interpretation of coefficients for national list placement models refer to a situation 
where negative coefficients are substantively better – the decrease in national list position 
refers to higher position on national list. Negative coefficient indicates the increase in 
binary dummy gender variable (i.e. being female) is associated with higher position on 
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the national list. As can be seen from Table 8 (pp 59), the effect of being female was 
significant and negative for list positioning for 2019 elections. Female candidates were 
associated with a list placement of 4.884 places higher than male candidates, other 
variables held constant. Although the association was negative for 2015 elections, it was 
not statistically significant. When it comes to other variables, recent political experience 
(incumbency) was significant for both 2015 and 2019 elections. For both elections, 
incumbent candidates were associated with higher positions on national lists. Although 
previous chapters have showed incumbency to be associated with higher vote share as 
well as better chances of getting elected from open lists, thus being less dependent on 
their position on national list than non-incumbent candidates, parties generally seem to 
place incumbents higher and thus secure their chances of getting elected. This might also 
indicate parties prefer a certain pool of already established candidates to enter the 
parliamentary arena and present the party. Similarly, cumulative legislative experience – 
time spent as a member of Riigikogu – is also negatively associated with list positions, 
although it is significant only for 2015 elections. The underlying logic is expected to be 
the same as for placing incumbents – increase in time spent as a member of parliament 
results in being placed on better position on national list. Age yielded negative and 
statistically significant association with list positioning for both elections – older 
candidates were placed higher on national lists. This could partly be explained by the 
experience factor, where older candidates have had more chance to gain political 
experience (e.g. the average age for incumbents is about 7 years older than for first-time 
candidates). Interestingly, party membership experience has positive and non-significant 
effect for both elections. Thus, membership status and length does not give benefits when 
it comes to being placed higher on national lists – parties do not value long-time members 
higher. When it comes to higher education, the results were mixed across elections. 
Candidates with higher education were associated with about 7 places higher positions in 
national lists for 2019 elections, other variables held constant. Although significant for 
2019 elections, it was positive but non-significant for 2015 elections.  
Incumbency – and in this case also age – remain important when explaining the factors 
affecting the decisions made about the placement of candidate throughout elections. Other 
factors, especially the effect of being female differed, for elections. However, the 
explanatory power of the models is quite poor, the variables explaining little of the 
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variance for the parties combined. This makes sense, given the strategies for list 
placements are expected to differ for each party. Thus, the model with same variables 
were ran for parties separately. The parties who proposed full lists of candidates for both 
elections were chosen. The models were applied for analysing Conservative Party (CP), 
Reform Party (REF), Pro Partia, Free Party (Free), Centre Party (Centre), and Social 
Democrats (SD). Following analysis presents the results of the models for each party for 
both of the elections separately.  
Table 9. Factors explaining candidates’ national lists positions for 2015 elections (parties 
separated, model 3).  
DV: national 
list position CP       REF Pro Partia Free Centre SD 
Coef. 
Intercept 97.387*** 97.948* 203.037*** 80.573 104.871* 83.068 
Female 14.492* -9.534 -7.082 -10.543 -6.667 -17.064* 
Incumbency  -27.749*** -32.221*** 11.751 -21.203 0.698 
Age -1.531 0.800 -6.168*** -0.784 -0.995 -0.593 
Age2 0.019 0.014 0.066*** 0.009 0.012 0.006 
Legislative 
experience 
(years) 
32.497* -2.428* -1.283 -4.777 -0.830 -2.593* 
Party 
membership 
experience 
(years) 
-0.155 -0.158 -0.362 5.132 -1.223* -0.014 
Higher 
education 
-24.334*** -16.231 10.385 -2.449 -10.607 3.651 
Observations 125 124 125 125 125 125 
R-squared 0.15 0.336 0.315 0.087 0.191 0.093 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.106 0.296 0.274 0.032 0.143 0.039 
F Statistic 3.471(df=6
;118) 
8.42(df=7;
116) 
7.695(df=7;
117) 
1.597(df=7;117
) 
3.968(df=7
;117) 
1.733(df
=7; 117) 
Note *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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As can be seen from Tables 9 (pp 61) and 10 (pp 65), Conservative Party was the only 
from the analysed parties where the effect of female coefficient was large and positive for 
national ranking of candidates for 2015 elections – this means female candidates were 
placed on lower positions, other variables held constant. Whilst Conservative Party had 
no incumbents among their lists for 2015 elections, but the history of the party saw the 
inclusion of some of the candidates with legislative experience, the “experienced” 
candidates were also placed on lower positions for national lists. Higher education is 
associated with higher position on the party lists. Other variables yielded little effects on 
the results for 2015 elections. When it comes to 2019 elections, the effect of female is 
still positive, but the coefficient notably smaller and non-significant, indicating there is a 
tendency to place women lower on national list, but the effect is not so apparent compared 
to 2015. Incumbency was negatively associated and significant, indicating incumbent 
candidates were associated with notably higher positions on national list. However, 
legislative experience still yielded positive and significant association, indicating the 
more cumulative parliamentary experience, the lower position candidate held. Education 
continued to be negatively and significantly associated with national position – those with 
higher education were placed higher on national list.  
For Reform Party, the effect of being female was negatively associated with position but 
non-significant. However, political experience, both in the forms of recent (incumbency) 
and cumulative (legislative) experience were significant predictors for national list 
position for both elections. Incumbency and legislative experience were negatively 
associated, indicating experienced candidates were placed higher on party lists, other 
variables held constant.  
The results were similar for Pro Partia, although the best predictor of list placement was 
incumbency, yielding negative and significant effect for both elections – incumbent 
candidates were associated with notably higher positions on list. The tendency was 
similar but non-significant for cumulative legislative experience. At the same time, 
candidate’s age was a significant contributor of the model for 2015 elections, where an 
increase of a year in age was associated with 6.168 places higher position on national list, 
other variables held constant, but the effect was smaller for the next elections. Being 
female was negatively associated with list placement but non-significant. 
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When it comes to Free Party, being female was associated with higher positions on 
national lists for both elections. Still, the percentage of female representatives elected to 
Riigikogu in 2015 from Free Party was high as female candidates were placed in the first 
positions. Hereby, the operationalisation of dependent variable does not allow to 
differentiate the effect of female for “very high” position and hence somewhat 
underestimates the effect of female for list placement for “electable” positions. Apart 
from this, age and education were significant in explaining the national list positions. 
Having higher education was associated with higher position on party lists for 2019 
elections. Similarly, an increase in age was associated with higher position on national 
list.  
For Centre Party, gender coefficient was negative and non-significant. Centre Party is 
known to apply zip-lock method for the first 12 positions on their national list already for 
several consecutive elections. However, when looking at the first 12 positions, almost all 
candidates were incumbents at the time of elections or have long parliamentary 
experience in Riigikogu in addition to party experience. Most of these candidates are 
strong candidates who stand good chances of getting elected regardless their position on 
national list. Thus, whilst the top of Centre Party’s list is gender-balanced, it seems it still 
aims to secure the seats primarily for established candidates (as opposed to trying to 
introduce new candidates and especially women). Incumbency and legislative experience 
were significant contributors to the model for 2019 elections, where candidates with 
experience were placed on higher positions. At the same time, for 2015 elections only 
party membership was negatively associated with national list placement and significant 
contributor to the model. An additional year of being a member of a party was associated 
with 1.223 places higher position on national list. Party membership experience still 
yielded negative association for 2019 elections, but the effect was non-significant. 
Incumbency and parliamentary experience have been more important indicators for party 
in their decisions for ranking the candidates in light of their position in the government 
in recent years.   
With 46 female candidates on their lists, Social Democratic Party had by far the most 
women-populated list in 2015 elections. The number of female candidates stayed almost 
same for 2019 elections, although the Greens and Estonia 200 surpassed Social 
Democratic Party’s “score” for female candidates in their lists. Social Democratic Party 
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was also the only party where the effect of being female had large and negatively 
association and was significant for both elections. Female candidates were associated 
with 14-17 places higher positions on national lists for 2015 and 2019 elections. 
Legislative experience is also significant and negatively associated for 2015 elections, 
indicating a year of parliamentary experience yielded almost three places higher position 
on national list. Party membership experience does not stand out as an important factor 
in placing candidates for national positions. Other variables did not show significant 
effects on list positioning.   
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Table 10. Factors explaining candidates’ position on national list for 2019 elections 
(model 3).  
DV: national 
list position 
CP Reform Pro Partia Free Centre SD 
 
Coef.  
Intercept 
112.361* 89.639** 114.919* 
172.697**
* 
68.674 82.292* 
 
Female 1.483 -6.446 -10.554 -9.777 -4.238 -14.520*  
Incumbency -105.639*** -33.563*** -46.053*** -34.310 -30.606*** -14.361  
Age -1.214 -0.146 -1.554 -3.944* -0.159 -0.949  
Age2 0.010 0.001 0.016 0.039** 0.007 0.015  
Legislative 
experience 
(years) 
15.628* -2.404* -1.754 -1.764 -2.374** 1.914 
 
Party 
membership 
experience 
(years) 
-0.533 -0.087 -0.028 -0.945 -0.645 -0.578 
 
Higher 
education 
-19.109** -9.007 -8.853 -19.672** 1.176 -2.110 
 
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125  
R-squared 0.236 0.368 0.347 0.200 0.413 0.101  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.190 0.330 0.308 0.152 0.378 0.047 
 
F Statistic 5.17(df=7;11
7) 
9.754(df=7
;117) 
8.893(df=7
;117) 
4.193(df=
7;117) 
11.77(df=7;
117) 
1.888(df
=7; 117) 
 
Note *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001  
 
Thus, whilst it can be observed that overall, parties place female candidates slightly higher 
than male candidates and the effect was larger and significant for 2019 elections, it can 
be attributed to the emergence of new or “renewed” (i.e. parties that have undergone 
structural and membership changes between election periods) parties, many of which are 
highly populated by women (e.g. Greens, Estonia 200, Free Party). Women are ranked 
notably better in these parties, but most of the candidates, regardless gender, have little 
political experience and thus stand less chance of getting elected from open lists as well 
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as their position on national lists do not increase their chances of getting elected when the 
party is not popular and does not exceed the quota. Furthermore, the more “established” 
Social Democratic Party still seems to follow other strategies for securing the success of 
some candidates and most of the candidates placed on high positions are still mostly 
politically experienced and well-known candidates. Whilst women have overall held less 
political positions, it does not necessarily help to increase the pool of female 
representatives, but still at least secures legislative position for some female candidates. 
When it comes to Reform and Centre Party, there are less women in their pool of 
candidates, but they are also not too far behind when it comes to the overall number of 
female candidates in the list. Although Centre Party uses zip-lock method for the first 12 
positions in their lists, this method does not seem to be aimed to introduce new candidates 
to parliamentary arena – the top candidates still possess other qualities regarded as 
significant when explaining their electoral success in previous chapters.  
Incumbency and political experiences deemed more important for already established 
parties. However, when it comes to Conservative Party and Pro Partia, there are notably 
less female candidates on their lists, especially what concerns Pro Partia (about a sixth of 
the candidates are women for both elections). Conservative Party placed female 
candidates on lower positions on national lists for both elections, but the effect of female 
was significant large for 2015 elections, when the poor position of female candidates 
prevented any of them from entering the legislative arena. The effect was non-significant 
and coefficient notably smaller for 2019, which – in combination with the good results in 
elections – also gave Kert Kingo a chance to receive compensatory mandate in 
Conservative Party’s list. Similarly, Pro Partia has few women on electable positions on 
their party lists. Although women are placed on higher positions throughout the lists, they 
are not placed in top-10-positons, making their entrance harder. Pro Partia has also very 
low percentage of female incumbent and politically experienced candidates, which partly 
explains the poor placement of women in Pro Partia, where experience yielded as 
important in explaining the positions of candidates. These parties are observed to have 
less female candidates on less favourable positions on their party lists, which might be a 
reflection of underlying ideological stances, but also mirror the poor success women in 
these parties have had in getting elected.  
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Incumbency and overall legislative experience were important in explaining the 
positioning of the candidates, with experienced candidates mostly placed higher on 
national lists. Education also yielded significant results for some cases. However, party 
membership status was mostly a poor predictor of list positioning. It yielded significant 
effect for Centre Party in 2015 elections, which might indicate that party experience could 
be important factor for established parties with high intra-party competition when in 
opposition, but as the analysis has shown, the factors explaining success of the candidates 
tend to differ for each election, making it hard to conclude if there are any outstanding 
tendencies. Overall, based on the “combined” party model as well as looking at the results 
for parties separately, it seems it is incumbents, rather than women per se who are 
preferred in list-placement strategies. Even though incumbents stand a good chance of 
getting elected, the results indicate that parties might be led by the strategies for securing 
the chances of incumbents – hence, parties do not tend to take risks. 
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Conclusion 
 
The literature on the representation of women – or more specifically – on the factors 
affecting the descriptive representation of women has been in academic interest for the 
last decades, when the effect of institutions and societal-cultural factors have been studied 
in efforts to explain the gender-specific differences among the pool of representatives. 
Whilst the discrepancies in the proportion of male and female representatives has called 
upon a concern for the potential inequalities with regards to the unequal distribution of 
(political) resources, the academic attention is reasoned. If, indeed, a social group as large 
as women has been consistently undermined in their efforts to be heard, it could have 
consequences for the quality of policies, sense of legitimacy, and societal norms. Thus, it 
is important to determine why and what accounts for the differences between men and 
women in society, and in the case of given thesis, more specifically in political sphere.  
The studies “tackling” factors contributing to electoral success of female candidates have 
tested the effects of institutional, cultural, and sociological factors for women’s chances 
of getting elected (e.g. Prihatini 2019) or being placed on electable positions (e.g. Chiru 
& Popescu 2017). However, whilst the differences between men’s and women’s success 
in terms of their descriptive representation have been acknowledged, the factors 
contributing to these differences are not straightforwardly connected to the effect of 
gender in itself – sometimes, the biases are alleviated when the effect of gender is tested 
in interaction with other characteristics of a candidate. 
The availability of candidate-specific data, the stability of electoral system, and the 
“peculiarities” of electoral rules in terms of ballot system has made Estonia an interesting 
case for study. Furthermore, the analytical framework provided by Mirjam Allik for 
previous elections has provided an opportunity to replicate the analysis also for 2015 and 
2019 elections and thus add onto the body of information, eventually allowing to assess 
the effects of success-contributing factors across different elections and examine the 
subtle increase in the number of female representatives. Moreover, this availability of 
candidate-level data also allows to test additional variables that could contribute to the 
understanding of female candidates’ success, proving a fruitful case for further research. 
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The differences between the genders in the pool of representatives can thus be studied 
from candidate-level perspective.  
Based on theory, it was hypothesised that women gain less votes, are less likely to get 
elected than men, but are overall positioned higher on party lists. Indeed, the analysis 
results yielded the effect of being female was negatively associated with vote share and 
probability of getting elected (for 2019 elections), but the effect was statistically 
significant only for the vote share of women for 2019 elections. However, the differences 
were alleviated when the model was specified with interaction terms, indicating women 
were not (significantly) undermined within the subgroups of candidates with similar 
characteristics – for example, first-time or incumbent female candidates did not do 
notably worse. The difference only occurred for education for vote share model, 
indicating female candidates with lower education received less votes, but the effect 
diminished for highly educated candidates. The vote share in 2015 and the electoral 
probabilities for both elections were non-significant, indicating the difference for women 
was marginal.  
When it comes to list positions, the model encompassing six parties who presented full 
lists for both elections indicated women were placed on higher positions in national lists, 
especially for 2019 elections. This election also saw an introduction to several new parties 
with the lists composing numerous women, which can explain the results. By zoning in 
on the placement of women, female candidates are indeed concentrated on the first half 
on the lists, however, less women than men are positioned on the “crucial” top 10 
positions for both elections. In fact, the share of women starts to truly increase for the 
positions below 20, where women, in reality, stand little chance of receiving 
compensatory mandate. Thus, the generally higher position does not necessarily account 
for a higher chance of receiving a mandate. However, this effect can differ across parties. 
The effect of gender on list positioning – expectedly – stood out for two parties: 
Conservative Party and Social Democrats. When all other parties placed female 
candidates higher on party lists, for Conservative Party, women were associated with 14 
places lower positions in 2015 elections. Although the coefficient for 2019 refers women 
were still placed on lower positions, the differences are not so outstanding. The effect of 
being female was the opposite for Social Democrats. Women were associated with 14 to 
17 places higher positions on national lists. For other parties, being women was also 
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associated with about 6-7 places higher positions on lists. However, the chance of getting 
elected from closed list is still up to the popularity of the party in elections. Women placed 
lower might still receive compensatory mandate when the party is popular 
Whilst it can be argued that higher positions on party lists can be considered inherently 
beneficial for women’s electoral potential, the placement of women on viable positions 
could be considered a better indicator for testing the potential for party bias. This 
specification provides possibilities for future research. It would require defining the 
“viability” of a position. Whilst some researchers approach this by creating binary 
variables (e.g. Kunovich 2003) presuming the positions of high chances of getting elected 
(e.g. the first position on the list can be regarded as the best in terms of potential of 
securing candidate’s election), or have relied on the results of previous elections when 
trying to determine how many seats party could receive in next elections (Allik 2015), 
the predictions based on previous elections might not reflect the current political situation 
well, and thus over- or underestimate the value for viable positions. However, trying to 
operationalize viable positions in terms of predicted success of parties in opinion polls 
could be considered as a new approach for operationalising “viable seats”, although this 
also sets limitations (prediction error, respondents’ bias etc). Proving true party bias was 
not the focal point of given thesis, but it would be a fruitful approach for future research 
for trying to better the understanding of the mechanisms altering electoral chances for 
female candidates in closed lists.  
The addition of new variables to success-models was noted to give insights for testing the 
relevance of other factors and their potential for contributing to candidates electoral 
chances. Higher education deemed to be important factor explaining the success of 
candidates. Cumulative legislative experience was positively associated, but mostly non-
significant contributor for both vote-share and seat-gaining models. It had a notable and 
significant positive effect on vote share only in 2015. Cumulative political experience 
might predict candidates’ success well when the political climate is stable and party 
system less fragmented, but its effect can be more open to fluctuations as new and 
relatively successful actors enter political arena, as can be seen from 2019 elections. 
Similarly, party membership experience yielded important in terms of vote share for both 
elections, but this effect did not translate to probabilities of getting elected. Party 
experience did not attract voters – but perhaps even more interestingly, the cumulative 
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party experience yielded only modest effect on placing the members up higher on the list. 
Thus, it showed “experienced” members of party do not necessarily stand a better chance 
when it comes to receiving better positions. However, for future research, this variable 
can be “modified”. As Estonian electoral rules allow non-affiliated candidates to run for 
elections under party’s list, the effect of affiliation could be tested on positions. The 
preliminary testing of this modification done for given thesis noted this addition did not 
better the explanatory power for vote- and seat-gaining models, but interesting 
associations arose for list placement models – affiliated candidates were associated with 
about 10 places lower positions in national lists.  
Continuing on possibilities of future research, the availability of candidate-level data has 
been highlighted as a virtue for studying Estonian elections. That being said, there are 
still several factors that could yield interesting results in explaining the variances between 
male and female candidates. For example, the occupation of candidates is listed in 
Electoral Committee data. This is candidate’s self-reported data which requires through 
categorization, but it could be added to analyses to see, whether women having certain 
occupational background would do better. Simultaneously, the candidate-party financing 
aspects could yield interesting results with the data of candidate’s personal expenditure 
and donations to party available. It could be tested whether candidate’s donations to party 
could benefit a candidate in their efforts to secure higher position on party lists. However, 
with most of the candidates not donating and the extremely big variances in the size of 
donations among those who do would require further “work” with the variable – for 
example, the differences could simply be tackled by making the variable categorical. This 
would strip it from some of the “magnitude”, but would help to generally indicate, 
whether higher donations could be associated with better positions as compared to lower 
ones. Even more so, the political experience of the candidate can be further specified. 
Similar cumulative values for holding a ministerial position could yield interesting results 
when explaining the success potential of a candidate. Simultaneously, the political 
experience at local government could be beneficial for candidate’s success. Hence, the 
availability of candidate-level data as well as the reasonable number of observations 
would allow further testing on the topic.   
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APPENDIX 1  
 
 
Table 10.  Explaining vote share for 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections (model 2.3).  
DV: logarithmic 
transformation of 
candidate’s vote share 
2015 
(model 2.3) 
2019 
(model 2.3) 
Coef. 
Intercept -5.127*** -5.139*** 
Female -0.177 -0.459* 
District list position -0.139*** -0.137*** 
National list position 0.001 -0.002* 
Incumbency 0.818*** 0.943*** 
Age 0.041* 0.034* 
Age2 -0.000* -0.000* 
Party votes in district 0.102*** 0.125*** 
Legislative experience 
(years) 
0.050** 0.015 
Party membership 
experience (years) 
0.008 0.020*** 
Higher education 0.564*** 0.481*** 
District magnitude -0.193*** -0.172*** 
District 
magnitude*female 
0.004 0.034 
Observations 861 1084 
R-squared 0.510 0.614 
Adjusted R-squared 0.503 0.609 
F Statistic 73.7 (df=12; 848) 142 (df=12; 1071) 
Note *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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